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The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 200 of 1993 which operated as the interim
constitution of the Republic introduced a new legal order predicated on constitutionalism and
constitutional supremacy. Within it was entrenched a justiciable Bill ofRights that guaranteed the
enforcement and protection of the fundamental rights of the individuals of the state .
Notionally and traditionally bills ofrights have been conceived as a mechanism for the protection and
enforcement of fundamental human rights against the state, the abuse of state authority and sate
power. Such an application has been typified as the vertical application of the bill of rights . During
the drafting process of the Interim Constitution, the Technical Committees commissioned by the
Multi-Party Negotiating Process for that purpose were preoccupied with the question as to whether
the South African Bill of Rights should apply in the private sphere between private persons acting
inter se; such an application being typified as the horizontal application. The result was an ambiguous
text .
The question of whether the Bill of Rights was indeed capable of a horizontal application was
intensely debated before the Constitutional Court of South Africa in Du Plessis And Others v De
Klerk AndAnother 1996 (3) SA 850. And in an equally intense judgment the majority of the Court
concluded that the Bill of Rights was not in general capable of a direct horizontal application.
Although influenced by a strenuous textual analysis, there were other considerations too that
influenced the Court's decision. One of the most important of these was that the operation of a bill
of rights in the private sphere would be contrary to the notion of a constitutional state and that it
would make the law vague and uncertain.
However, the very same Constitutional Court a few months later in In Re: Certification of the
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, 1996 (10) BCLR 1253 (CC) certified that
Section 8 (2) ofChapter 3 unequivocally provided for the horizontal application ofthe Bill ofRights .
This dissertation examines the paradigms within which the Bill of Rights operates horizontally and
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INTRODUCTION
The Constitution of the Republic of South African, Act 200 Of 1993, was promulgated into law as
an interim constitution to be replaced by a final text within a specified period. The Interim
Constitution heralded a new legal order that brought with it constitutional supremacy and a justiciable
Bill ofRights in terms ofwhich human rights guarantees were entrenched against abuse by the state.
This was typically in accordance with the universally accepted notion that bills ofrights operated only
between the individual and the state. This relationship was subject to ultimate constitutional scrutiny
by the Constitutional Court which was endowed with the residual power of review.
During the drafting process ofthe Interim Constitution, there was much debate as to whether the Bill
of Rights should apply not only between individuals and the state, i.e. vertically, but also between
private individuals inter se, i.e. horizontally. The result was an ambiguous text.
The debate came before the Constitutional Court in Du Plessis And Others vDe Klerk AndAnother
1996 (3) SA 850 for resolution. The majority ofthe justices prompted by a strenuous textual analysis
and interpretation, concluded that the South African Bill of Rights was not of general direct
horizontal application. In arriving at its decision, the Court, however, expressed other reasons of
grave concern for not readily pronouncing an application ofhorizontality.
Ironically and contemporaneously with the deliberation ofthe Court, the new text ofthe Constitution
was being drafted and was signed into law not long after the judgment. The most significant changes
introduced by the new text was that the Bill ofRights would now also apply between private persons,
i.e. horizontally, and equally significantly the judiciary like the other organs of state would be bound
by the Bill ofRights.
This dissertation therefore attempts to respond to the apprehensions raised by the judgment in Du
Plessis v De Klerk. From an analysis of the judgment, it will endeavour to establish the nature and
scope of the horizontal application of the South African Bill ofRights, the role and function of the
courts in such an application, and the effect of horizontality in the private sphere and on African
customary law.
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THE HORIZONTAL APPLICATION OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN BILL OF RIGHTS
CHAPTER 1
Du Plessis and Others v De Klerk and Another Revisited
1. Introduction
Traditionally, Bills ofRights were conceived and are still perceived as legal instruments acting as a
bulwark against the abuse ofstate power vis-a-vis the subjects ofthe state.' Typically, the traditional
notion ofsuch an application ofa billofrights described above is commonly referred to as the vertical
application . In terms of public international law, states were the recipient of rights and individuals
were not .2
However, there is a tendency worldwide to recognize a need for bills of rights to afford private
individuals protection against not only the abuses of state power but against the exertion ofsuperior
social and economic power of other private individuals in modem-day societies .' This tendency
appeared in the drafting of the first South African Bill of Rights so as to apply not only between
individuals and the state in respect ofstate authority but between private individuals interse inprivate
relationships . This latter notion is typically referred to as the horizontal application of the Bill of
Rights .
See Lorenzo Togni 'A Macrocosmic Perspective of the Human Rights Movement ' in
The Struggle For Human Rights An International And South Af rican Perspective 1994.
2
3
I M Rautenbach General Provisions ofthe South Af rican Bill ofRights 1995 at 3-4.
L du Plessis & H Corder 'The Genesis of the Operational Provisions of the Chapter on
Fundamental Rights ' in Understanding South Af rica's Transitional Bill ofRights 1994
at 113.
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1.2 The South African Bill of Rights
1.2.1 The Interim Bill ofRights
South Africa's first Bill of Rights which appeared in Chapter Three of the Constitution of the
Republic of South Africa, 19934 and operated as an interim Bill of Rights was conceived as a
compromise between those infavour of the traditional approach, the verticalists and those in favour
of the modern approach, the horizontalists.' The product was an ambiguous text that spawned and
generated frenetic debates amongst both legal academics and practitioners alike with the dilemma
being resolved to some extent in Du Plessis and Others v De Klerk and Another" where the
Constitutional Court held that the interim Bill of Rights did not have a general direct horizontal
application .
1.2.2 The New Text
Contemporaneously with the issue ofhorizontality being deliberated by the Constitutional Court, the
Constitutional Assembly of the South African government had completed the draft of the new text
of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa where the Bill of Rights is specifically made
applicable between private persons. In other words, horizontality is now explicit.




Act 200 of 1993 hereafter the Interim Constitution.
See Cacha1ia et al Fundamental Rights in the New Constitution 1994 at 19-21; and du
Plessis & Corder op cit n 3 at 110-114.
1996 (3) SA 850; 1996 (5) BCLR 658 (CC) hereafter Du Plessis v De Klerk 1996 (3)
SA 850.
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be examined further in order to determine the extent to which the horizontal application of the Bill
ofRights will be able to address them and what impact ,if any, such an application will have on the
development of the law.
1.3 Du Plessis v De Klerk Revisited.
The dilemma as to whether the Bill ofRights in the Interim Constitution did in fact apply horizontally
as well as vertically was finally decided by the Constitutional Court in Du PlessisAnd Othersv De
Klerk And Another', Kentridge AJ writing for the Court finally concluded that although the Bill of
Rights inChapter 3 ofthe Interim Constitution may and should have an influence on the development
of the common-law, it was not ofgeneral" direct horizontal application. In arriving at this finding,
the Court raised the following issues that need to be resolved with reference to the horizontal
application of the new constitutional text.
1.3.1 The Function of the Courts and the Role of the Judiciary
Relying upon the interpretation of the jurisdiction conferred upon it in terms of Section 98 of the
Interim Constitution, the Constitutional Court held that it was not suited to the exposition of the
principles of private law and that the reformulation of the common law and customary law was the
task of the Supreme Court. It held that it had no inherent or general jurisdiction to re-write the




Du Plessis v De Klerk op cit n 6.
Own emphasis.
Du Plessis v De Klerk op cit n 6 para[52]at 880 and [60] at 885..
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Kentridge AJ also concluded that while the Interim Constitution allowed for the ' striking down' of
statutes inconsistent with it, a similarjurisdiction did not fall upon the courts to strike down rules of
the common law as these would create lacunae in the law. He added that although the development
of the common law by the courts was achieved incrementally, it was not done so by striking down'?
and that the radical amelioration of it was the function ofParliament not that of the courts.11
The issue as to the radical development of the common law was raised also by Sachs J. The learned
justice was ofthe opinion that the issue before the Court in respect ofhorizontaltiy and verticality was
not about constitutional values but rather about which institutions the Interim Constitution envisaged
as being responsible to give effect to those values. Somewhat critically he examines the function of
the Constitutional Court with that ofParliament and concluded that a direct horizontal application
of the Bill of Rights would result in what he termed a ' dikastocracy' in that the courts would be
obliged to reformulate the common-law. This would amount to a rule by judges (a 'dikastocracy')
which would result in a usurpation ofthe function ofParliament. 12 The learned judge also questioned
the propriety ofthe Constitutional Court in directly examining concepts ofcustomary and indigenous
law, a function more suited to Parliament. 13





Op cit para[58] at 884.
Op cit para[53] at 88l.
Op cit para [178-181] at 931-932.
Op cit [189] read with para [180] at 935 & 931 resp.
6
caricature' in an Orwellian society resulting from a direct horizontal application of the bill of rights.
The learned judge claimed that the true debate was not one ofverticality versus horizontality but as
one that related to the manner ofthe horizontal application of the Bill ofRights and it mattered not
whether such application was direct or indirect.14 What in fact was important was that the Interim
Constitution mandated all courts to have due regard to the 'spirit, purport and objects' in terms of
Section 35(3) of Chapter 3 when interpreting statutory law and when applying and developing the
common law and customary law."
A not too dissimilar view was expressed by Mahomed J who stated that according to his
interpretation Section 35(3) would endow upon the different divisions of the Supreme Court,
including the Appellate Division, 'a very clear and creative role in the active evolution of our
constitutional jurisprudence'16 by examining and expanding the traditional frontiers of the common
law and infusing it with the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights with the Constitutional
Court having the residual power to determine whether a Supreme Court has acted properly in
applying the provisions of Section 35(3) .
1.3.2 Horizontality in the Private Sphere
In substantiating his view that only an indirect application of the Bill of Rights to the common law




Op cit paras [119-122] at 909-910.
Op cit para [141] at 917.
Op cit para [87] at 897-898.
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33(1) would lead to insurmountable problems" and that a direct application would invoke numerous
provisions of the Chapter 3 in private litigation .18
A more strenuous effort at dispelling the intention of a direct application ofthe Bill ofRights in the
private sphere is abundantly manifest in the judgment ofAckermann 1. The learned judge raised grave
concerns about the impact a direct horizontal application would have in practice." These were :
(a) A direct application of the Bill of Rights would make the law vague and uncertain and is
contrary to the concept of the constitutional state;
(b) A direct application of the fundamental rights to private relations would severely undermine
private autonomy;
(c) A direct application of the basic rights in disputes between private individuals would place
duties on them and necessitate the balancing of competing rights;
(d) A balancing ofrights would lead to conflicting decisions by the courts which would result in
numerous appeals to the Constitutional Court in matters that would otherwise be of a




Gp cit para [55] at 88l.
Op cit para [57] at 882.
Op cit paras [97-102 & 112] at 900-902 & 906 resp .
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reforming the private common law
and
(b) A direct application ofthe basic rights would turn the Constitution, contrary to its historical
evolution ofconstitutional individual rights protection, also into a code ofcivil obligations for
private individuals with no indication as to how clashing rights and duties are to be resolved
or how clashing rights are to be balanced.
The learned judge preferred the approach of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany which
adopted the mittelbare drittwirkung i.e. an indirect horizontal application of the Bill of Rights in
disputes between private persons.
However, in contrast to the majority ruling, Madala J after reference to the preamble and post-amble
of the Interim Constitution and the values enshrined in it, was of the opinion that one of its basic
concerns was to transform the South African social and legal system into one that upholds principles
ofdemocracy and human rights not only as between individual and state but between individuals inter
se. He held that as a matter of interpretation certain provisions of the Bill ofRights were capable of
direct as well as indirect application. And in determining this, a court should examine every
enumerated right and decide whether it could sensibly be applied in the private domain. Such a
determination would depend on the nature and extent ofthe particular right , the values that underlie
it, and the context in which the alleged breach of the right occurs."
20 Op cit paras [161 & 165 at 926 & 927.
9
1.3.3 Customary Law
Only two judges ofthe Constitutional Court raised the issue as to the implications ofthe Constitution
for customary and indigenous law. According to Mokgoro J South African customary law had been
marginalised and allowed to degenerate into 'a vitrified set of norms alienated from its roots in the
community' and that there is 'significant scope for the dynamic application and development of
customary law by the courts in a manner that has "due regard to the spirit, purport and objects" of
chapter 3. ,21 Similarly, Sachs J was ofthe view that an indirect application ofthe Bill ofRights would
allow 'courts closer to the ground' to develop customary law in an incremental manner so as to
harmonize with the principles of the Chapter 3 rights.22
1.4 Conclusion
The question ofhorizontality is indeed a vexed question. While it may be agreed that essentially a
bill ofrights is typically a legal instrument protecting the fundamental rights ofindividuals against the
awesome might of state power, control and authority, there was no unanimity as to its direct
horizontal application.
With regard to the diversity ofjudicial opinions, Karthy Govender comments as follows, '[g]iven the
passion with which the different positions were defended and opposing positions attacked, it is
apparent that the philosophies and predilections ofthe different justices influenced the interpretation
21
22
Op cit para [172] at 929.
Op cit para [189] at 935.
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they gave to the text . The adoption ofdirect horizontality brings with it awesome responsibilities. ,23
The impact could be awesome for serious questions may be raised with reference to the content of
issues discussed above.
This dissertation will attempt to seek answers to such questions as to:
(1) how is horizontality to apply within the context ofthe operational provisions ofthe new text;
(2) what principles of constitutional interpretation would be applied by the courts and other
forums in the application and development of the common law and customary law and what
would be the functions of the courts and the role of the judiciary and the legislature in
reformulating the common law;
(3) how would private common law principles which were entrenched over centuries be affected
when it is necessary to balance equally competing rights between litigating private parties;
and
(4) What would be the impact on African customary law which too has developed from deeply
entrenched patriarchal and agnate relationships .
23
Karthy Govender 'Horizontality Revisited In The Light ofDu Plessis V De Klerk And Clause 8 Of The
Republic Of South Africa Constitution Bill 1996' (1996) 1.3 The Human Rights And Constitutional
Journal ofSouthern Africa 20-23 at 22 .
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THE HORIZONTAL APPLICATION OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN BILL OF RIGHTS
CHAPTER 2
THE HORIZONTAL OPERATION OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS
2.1 Introduction
The majority decision in Du Plessis and Others v De Klerk andAnother 1 after an exhaustive textual
analysis and strenuous interpretation of the Interim Constitution concluded that the Chapter 3
provision ofthe fundamental rights was not intended to have a general direct horizontal application.2
Only Kriegler J, with whom Didcott J concurred entirely, in a display ofjudicial activism held in a
dissenting judgment that the Bill of Rights was indeed capable of horizontal application. Although
there was general consensus, some of the judges who agreed with the majority did so for different
reasons.
However, the question arises whether the statement of Mahomed DP (as he was then) could be
particularly apposite when he claimed that the debate between Kentridge AJ who wrote for the court
and Kriegler J would be ofno substantial practical consequence but ofhistorical importance only in
view of the fact that the 'interim Constitution [would] already have been overtaken by a new
1996 (3) SA 850.
2
i.e. application between private individuals on an equal footing as opposed to a ' vertical' application i.e.
between individual and the state.
13
constitutional text with quite different formulations impacting on the problem." This in fact has
happened.
2.2 The New Constitutional Text
The new constitutional text was approved by the President on 10 December 1996 and promulgated
into law as the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, Act 108 of 1996. Before the
adoption ofthe Constitution, the provisions ofthe draft text had to be certified by the Constitutional
Court as having complied with the constitutional principles enumerated in Schedule 4 ofthe Interim
Constitution.4
The Constitutional Court deliberated over the new text of the Constitution and dealt with specific
objections that were raised.' Of relevance to this chapter was the certification of Section 8(2) ofthe
Constitution which reads:
A provision of the Bill of rights binds natural and juristic persons if, and to the
extent that, it is applicable, taking into account the nature of the right and any
duty imposed by the right.





Op cit n 1 para [73] at 892.
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1993, Act 200 of 1993, Section 71(2).
IN RE: CERTIFICATION OF TIffi CONS1ITUTION OF TIffi REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA, 1996;
1996 BCLR (10) 1253(CC) .
Op cit n 5 paras [53-56] 1280-1281.
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Firstly.it was argued that the horizontal application of fundamental rights was not universally
accepted. While the Court agreed that that might be so, CP II did not preclude the CA from including
provisions in the NT which were not universally acceptable.' CP IT of Schedule 4 provides:
Everyone shall enjoy all universally accepted fundamental rights, freedoms and
civil liberties, which shall be provided for and protected by entrenched and
justiciable provisions in the Constitution, which shall be drafted after giving due
consideration to inter alia the fundamental rights contained in Chapter 3 of this
Constitution.
Secondly it was argued that a horizontal application between private persons would render the NT
inconsistent with CP VI which required a separation ofpowers between the legislature, the executive
and judiciary. The effect of this would be to allow the judiciary to encroach upon the legislative
domain of the legislature thereby usurping the function ofgovernment in that the courts would alter
legislation and particularly the common law. This objection, the Court held, was flawed in two
respects. First, the courts were always regarded as the sole arm of government responsible for the
development of the common law and that there could be no separation of powers objection to the
courts retaining their power over the common law. Second, while the courts have no power to alter
legislation, it did in terms of the New Text have the power to review legislation as to whether it
would be consistent with the principles enshrined in the Constitution. This would be so even if the
Bill ofRights did not apply horizontally. The Court held that even if the Bill ofRights did not bind
private persons, it was, in any event, binding on the legislature and legislation would still be subject
to review by the courts.
7
CP IT = CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES; CA = CONSTITUTIONAL ASSE1vffiLY; NI = NEW TEXT.
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The third objection was that NT 8(2) would bestow upon the courts the task ofbalancing competing
rights which was not its proper judicial function. This the Court ruled would still be its function even
if the Bill ofRights bound state organs only. It added also that the task may have to be performed
where the bearer ofthe obligation would be a private person and that although it would be a difficult
one, it still fell within the competency of the courts and was within the contemplation of the CPs.
The fourth objection was based on the contention that NT 8(2) offended CP 11 in that private
individuals were to be the beneficiaries only ofuniversally accepted fundamental rights and freedoms
and not the bearers of obligations . As bearers of obligations, private individuals would necessarily
suffer a diminution of their rights and this was contrary to that which was expressed in CP 11. The
Court countered this argument by stating that as long as the legislature was bound by the Bill of
Rights, any legislation relating to private individuals would come under judicial scrutiny which
invariably would involve the courts in balancing competing claims. And together with the fact that
individual rights may be justifiably limited in the recognition of the rights of other individuals by a
horizontal application did not for that reason mean that the CP 11 principle had been breached.
Despite the fact that the nature of the enquiries was different, the certification of the horizontal
application of the Bill of Rights by the Constitutional Court was in sharp contrast to its majority
ruling in Du Plessis and Others v De Klerk and Another' and indicates a shift from its somewhat
8
Gp cit n 1.
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conservatively literal and textual interpretative methodology to one that is more sympathetic
towards judicial activism. This now stimulates an enquiry into what impact will the horizontal
application of the Bill of Rights have in the sphere of the private law. But before then it will be
necessary to determine the nature and scope of the operational provisions of the Bill ofRights.
2.3 The Operational Provisions of the Bill of Rights
The most important operational provisions of the Bill ofRights are the following:
(i) Section 8 on the application of the Bill ofRights ;
(ii) Section 36 on the limitation of rights ;
(iii) Section 38 on the enforcement of rights; and
(iv) Section 39 on the interpretation of the Bill ofRights.
The above provisions demand not only a cumulative interpretation but compel a structural analysis
in order to determine the ambit of the horizontal application of the Bill ofRights.
9 There were other considerations too. With reference to the assertions of the Interim
Constitution, the majority held that Chapter 3 bound only the legislative and executive
organs of the State . This was ascertained from the fact that had the Interim Constitution
required that it applied to all relationships it would have expressly stated so. Further , s
33 (4) which did not preclude measures designed to prohibit unfair discrimination by
bodies and persons other than the legislature and the executive and s 35 (3) allowed for
the indirect application of Chapter 3 to common law disputes between private persons
would not have been necessary had a general application been intended.
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2.3 .1 Section 8 on the Application of the Bill ofRights
2.3.1.1 Section 8(1)
Section 8 (1) provides as follows:
The Bill of Rights applies to all law, and binds the legislature ,
the executive, the judiciary and all organs of state.
In contradistinction to its counterpart, namely section 7(1) of the Interim Constitution, Section 8(1)
has introduced significant additions. It applies to all law, and now binds the judiciary in addition to
the other arms of government as well as all organs of state and not only executive organs of state.
The reference to all law must now be taken to mean not only statute law but the common law as well.
This conclusion is obvious in the light of the Constitutional Court's declaration of the horizontal
application ofthe Bill ofRights in the certification process. This conclusion also resolves the conflict
ofinterpretation posited by Kentridge AJ in his strenuous textual interpretation in the use ofthe word
law and the Afrikaans equivalent of 'wet' and 'reg'." Further, it appeases the interpretation favoured
by Kriegler J11 in that the Bill ofRights governs all law in force and that 'there is no qualification, no
exception. All means all' and consolidates Mahomed J's averment that there is no right which exists
in the modem state that 'is not ultimately sourced in some law, even if it be no more than an




Gp cit n 1 para [44] at 876.
Op cit para [130] at 913.
Op cit para [79] at 894.
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The inclusion of the judiciary being now bound by the Bill ofRights has far reaching consequences.
It puts paid to Kentridge AJ's claim that the omission was not an oversight but that its effect was to
exclude the importation of the 'state action doctrine' ofAmerican constitutional jurisprudence. 13 It
means that the judiciary is now bound to the same extent as the other organs of state in applying the
Bill ofRights and that not only the judgments ofthe courts but their deliberations too shall henceforth
come under constitutional review. 14
As regards all organs of state being bound by the Bill of Rights, reference must be had to the
definitions enunciated in Section 239 of the Constitution wherein an organ of state means -
(a) any department of state or administration in the national, provincial or local sphere of
government; or
(b) any other functionary or institution-
(i) exercising a power or performing a function in terms of the Constitution
or a provincial constitution; or
(ii) exercising a public power or performing a public function in terms of
any legislation, but does not include a court or a judicial officer;
13
14
Gp cit para [47] at 877.
See the Canadian cases of R v Rahey [1987] 1 SCR 588, 39 DLR (4th) 481 where the
Supreme Court of Canada held that a criminal court 's delay in ruling on an application
for directed verdict was a breach of the Canadian Charter as well as BCGEU v British
Columbia (Attorney General) [1988] 2 SCR 214,53 DLR (4th) 1 in which the same
court held that an injunction by a judge issued on his own motion to restrain picketing
by a union outside his court building was subject to the Canadian Charter.
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What emerges from the above definitions is that in terms ofSection 239(b)(ii), an organ which might
well be a private or juristic person which performs a public power or a public function in terms ofany
legislation is defined as a state organ. An example of such an organ could be a commercial bank, a
charitable organization, parastatals or individuals such as an ombudsperson or even the independent
electoral commissioner. The effect is that if such persons could not be bound in terms of the
horizontal application of the Bill ofRights, then they could be bound under the vertical application
of it.
2.3.1 .2 Section 8(2)
To recapitulate Section 8(2) reads:
A provision of the Bill of Rights binds a natural or a juristic person if, and to the
extent that, it is applicable, taking into account the nature of the right and the
nature of any duty imposed by the right.
This section represents the most significant change in the Bill ofRights and settles at least for the
time-being the Manichean debate" between the verticalist adherents and those ofthe horizontalists.
Section 8(2) unequivocally not only binds but applies to natural persons as well as juristic persons.
The type ofjuristic person is determined in accordance with the nature of the right and the nature
of the juristic person in terms of Section 8(4) . Section 8(1) does not include natural and juristic
persons for the reason that it would have permitted an unqualified application of the Bill of Rights
in private disputes which undoubtedly would have created insurmountable problems and would have
IS
See Stuart Woolman 'Application' in Chaskalson et al Constitutional Law in South Africa 1996.
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indeed produced an 'egregious caricature of an Orwellian society' .16 What Section 8(2) does is to
qualify the manner in which the Bill of Rights is to operate horizontally between private persons,
natural or juristic, by setting internal modifiers.
These modifiers are that before a right binds a natural or juristic person, the following must be met:
(a) the right must be applicable with reference to :
(i) the nature of the right ; and
(ii) the nature of the duty imposed by the right.
It is submitted that this begs both a sequential enquiry and a cumulative construction. In the first
instance, if reliance is sought in this section, it must be determined whether a right that is impugned
is one that is protected under the Bill ofRights. If it is so, then the second instance would demand
an enquiry whether the particular right is capable of application with reference to its suitability. The
question ofsuitabilitywould have to be resolved with reference to not only the nature ofthe right but
with reference to the nature of the correlative duty imposed by the right. From the above the first
enquiry is sequential in that if a right is not one that is constitutionally guaranteed, then that is the end
ofthe matter. But ifit is, then it follows sequentially that the next stage ofthe enquiry is whether the
right is capable ofapplication with reference to its suitability by taking into consideration cumulatively
both the nature of the right and the correlative duty it imposes. If with reference to its nature it
emerges that a right is applicable, such a finding does not in itself satisfy the requirement that the
parties are bound if it emerges also that the nature of the duty is such that it cannot be suitably
imposed on a private person either natural or juristic. All preceding enquiries would collapse and the
right then would not be applicable.
Facially, almost every right in the Bill ofRights will be enforceable but whether as between private
persons, either natural or juristic, can ultimately be determined by the criterion of suitability which
16
Per Kriegler J op cit n 1 para [120] at 909.
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can be considered crucial to such a determination. Perhaps it is this criterion of suitability that will
revive the Manichean debate between ardent verticalists and horizontalist. It is this criterion of
suitability that will inevitably confer upon the courts the power to exercise a discretion as to the
suitability or non-suitability of an impugned right for horizontal application. In applying the above
structure of analysis, the enquiry as to applicability whether at the instance ofthe courts or lawyers
for the litigants must inevitably turn to the Bill ofRights itselffor indicia that will aid the interpretive
process and establish the result.
2.3.1.3 Indiciae for Horizontality
The interpretive process will involve both a textual and contextual analysis of the Chapter 2 Bill of
Rights and the Constitution. Constitutionally, the very fundamental nature of the right itself will
unequivocally indicate horizontal application; for example, the common law right to equality, dignity,
freedom, privacy and the like. Others too by their very nature support horizontal application such as
children's rights and labour rights .
2.3.1.4 The Text
Textually, the wording of the provision will provide guidance in determining horizontality. For
example, Section 13 provides that no one may be subjected to slavery, servitude and forced labour
implies that the right not only binds the state but other persons too, both natural and otherwise.
Section 30 while conferring on everyone the right to language and culture also specifically provides
that no one exercising these rights may do so in a manner inconsistent with any provision ofthe Bill
ofRights. Another example is that ofSection 9(4) which states that no one may unfairly discriminate
directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds in terms of subsection (3) . National
legislation must be enacted to prevent or prohibit unfair discrimination. In this case a court will
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probably exercise a discretion whether to apply the provision notwithstanding that legislation must
yet be enacted; alternatively it might take a conservative view that in the absence of the relevant
legislation the provision is inapplicable to horizontal relationships until legislation has been enacted.
A further example is that of Section 32( 1)(b) which confers the right of access to information that is
held by another person and that is required for the exercise or the protection ofany rights. Subsection
2 here again provides that national legislation must be enacted to give effect to this right. In this case
it is more explicit that relevant legislation is a prerequisite for horizontal application ; that this is a
plausible interpretation can be substantiated by Section 8(3) which mandates a court to apply existing
legislation to a provision of the Bill ofRights in so far as horizontality is concerned before applying
relevant common law. In Section 9(4) legislation is to prevent or prohibit acts ofunfair discrimination
whereas in Section 32(2) it is to give effect to a right.
2.3.1.5 The Context
The context ofthe Constitution can be a useful aid to constitutional interpretation for the purpose of
determining horizontality. There are indeed rights, albeit entrenched, that impose correlative duties
that are more appropriate as state functions than duties to be performed by private persons. Examples
of such rights that impose duties on state functionaries are the right to just administrative action in
Section 33, and the rights of arrested, detained and accused persons in terms of Section 35.
Generally, it may be accepted that the socio-economic rights to housing and health care (the so-called
second generation rights) and rights to an environment that is not harmful (the so-called third
generation rights) are not intended for horizontal application as they are not suitable for such
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application. It may be argued that in certain instances these rights may well be imposed upon private
persons, for example where one spouse may demand a right to housing in a healthy environment from
the other spouse. With reference to and within the context of the facts of the case, a court may
conclude that the nature of the duty that the right in question imposes is too onerous a duty on the
incumbent and therefore should not be applied. This, in any event, is already an established principle
in the common law ofcontract. 17 However, Section 11 which provides for the right to life and Section
27(3) which provides that no one may be refused emergency medical treatment are ostensibly duties
imposed upon the state, namely to provide protection for subjects ofthe state and for the provisioning
of medical care.
The right to emergency medical treatment was dealt with by the Constitutional Court inSoobramoney
vMinisterofHealth, KwaZulu-Natal. 18 The Court confirmed that the State had a positive obligation
to provide emergency medical treatment but subject to available resources. The Court was satisfied
that since the province, and the hospital also, were seriously lacking in medical resources for the
treatment and since the appellant was chronically ill with renal dysfunction together with other life-
threatening diseases, the denial of emergency medical treatment was not unconstitutional.
The query now is whether a court would adopt a similar inquiry in respect ofthe private sector such
as a private hospital offering haemodialysis programmes. Madala J was of the view that such
hospitals would indeed have such a function and would do much to alleviate the burden on hard-
17
18
Haynes v Kingwilliamstown M unicipality 1951 2 SA 371 (A ).
1997 (12) BCLR 1696 (CC).
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pressed institutions of the public sector save that where a private hospital which has the resources
fails to provide alternative treatment, such would be a serious indictment against it." From this
judgment, it can be submitted that in essence there would be no substantial difference between the
application of the Bill ofRights applied either vertically or horizontally."
Similarly, the question arises whether a private medical doctor who is a spectator at the scene of an
accident is obliged to render medical assistance to a dying accident victim. That this may be so is
already settled in the law of delict where the court in Minister van Polisie v Ewels" held that an
omission to act was unlawful not only when such failure occasions moral indignation but where the
ultimate question is whether all facts considered there was a legal duty to act reasonably. The point
then is why bring an identical cause of action in common law under the purview of the constitution
unless it is to constitutionalize it. It is submitted that there is nothing wrong with this as the
Constitution in terms of Section 2 superimposes itself as the supreme law of the Republic and
proscribes law or conduct inconsistent with it as invalid. Even if it is brought under the purview of
the Constitution, the courts are mandated to apply the existing common law in the absence of
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Contextually, the values underlying the Constitution may be both informative and instructive to a
court as to the horizontal applicability of an entrenched right. The rights to human dignity, equality
and freedom would appear as the most fundamental rights in the Constitution. That this is so, may
be gleaned from the frequency of reference to these rights in the Constitution." There is no reason
to believe that a court must promote the spirit, purport and objects ofthe Bill ofRights only in cases
ofthe indirect application ofit; there is every reason why it should do so in cases ofdirect application
as well. It is submitted that in determining horizontality with reference to the nature ofthe right and
the nature of the duty imposed by the right, a court should always be informed by the values and
norms underscoring the Constitution."
2.3.1.6 Section 8(3).
Once an issue is determined for horizontal application in terms of Section 8(2), a court must then
apply the provisions of section 8(3) in resolving the matter.
Section 8(3) reads :
When applying a provision of a Bill of Rights to a natural or a juristic person in
terms of subsection (2), a court -
(a) in order to give effect to a right in the Bill, must apply, or if necessary develop, the common
law to the extent that legislation does not give effect to that right ; and
(b) may develop rules of the common law to limit the right , provided that the limitation is in
accordance with section 36(1).
22
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See Sections l(a), 7(1) and 39(1)(a) read together with Section 39(2).
See Gardener v Whitaker 1995 (5) BCLR 19 (E) at 30 G-I & Holomisa v Argus
Newspapers Limited 1996 (6) BCLR 836 (W) at 844 1-1.
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Section 8(3)(a) is highly prescriptive and mandates a court to undertake the following stages when
applying the Bill ofRights horizontally:
(i) It must look to existing legislation that gives effect to the right in question. In doing this, it
must determine to what extent such legislation does give effect. If the relevant legislation
gives full effect to the right, then the court must apply the relevant legislation; alternatively
if the nature ofthe effect is to limit the right, then the court must apply the relevant legislation
accordingly with reference to the limitation provisions of Section 36(1).
(ii) If there is no legislation giving effect to the right or where it does so partly but not entirely,
a court must look to the common law. If a common law rule exists that gives effect to the
right, it must apply that law.
(iii) Where there is neither legislation nor a common law rule giving effect to the right in question,
or where there is legislation or a common law rule that gives partial effect to an entrenched
right, a court must develop the common law to give full effect to the right.
However, Section 8(3)(b) is permissive in that inapplying or developing a common law rule to give
effect to the right, a court may develop rules of the common law to limit the right, provided that the
limitation is in accordance with Section 36(1).
2.3.2 Limitation on Horizontality
Section 8(3)(b) permits a court to develop rules of the common law to limit a right in terms of
Section 36(1) which specifies that such limitation must be reasonable in an open and democratic
society based on human dignity, equality and freedom. What should be noted that is that Section
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36(1) is significantly different from its counterpart of Section 33(1) in the Interim Constitution. The
most important is that any limitation of a right in terms of Section 36(1) must be reasonable and
justifiable in an open and democratic society based not only equality and freedom but now also on
human dignity. Further, a limitation need not be necessary as was the requirement in respect ofcertain
specified rights nor need it negate the essential content of a right.
Perhaps, the excision ofthe requirement ofa limitation being necessary makes for a more flexible and
less restrained application ofthe limitation provision but that ofa limitation not negating the essential
content of a right would remove difficulties associated with interpretation.24
In determining the limitation ofa right, Section 36(1) sets out the relevant criteria which a court must
examine in the process of limiting a right. These are :
(a) the nature of the right;
(b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation;
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation;
(d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and
(e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.
These criteria the legislature adopted verbatim from S v Makwanyane And Another" where the
Constitutional Court in establishing them held that the process of limiting rights must involve the
24
25
S v Makwanyane And Another 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC) para [132] at 718.
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weighing up of competing values and interests which ultimately will engage an assessment based on
proportionality but , however despite this, there is no absolute standard to determine reasonableness.
The application of the proportionality test will inevitably compel an assessment on a case-by-case
basis .
This provision as applied to the common law will undoubtedly present the greatest challenge to our
courts in developing rules of the common law to limit a constitutional right. But it must also be
observed that, in any event , our courts have always been engaged in the balancing of competing
interests in the development of the common law. There is , however, the possibility that when
competing interests are weighed up between one private individual against another the process may
be more nuanced and delicate than in the case between a private individual and the state - the former
requiring 'a more gentle adjustment of borders than the use of the shopkeeper's scales'" as would
be the case in the latter. Thus in determining whether, for example, the denial of emergency medical
treatment is unconstitutional will vary between where the onus rests on a private natural person, a
private hospital and state hospital respectively. It is to be expected that although applying the same
criteria in determining reasonableness, the manner and degree of application will differ.
Although Lourens du Plessis is of the opinion that the more 'user-friendly' text of Section 36(1)
"leaves slightly less room for creative interpretation - which with a limitation clause, can either be
26
Halton Cheadle and Dennis Davis ' The Application of the 1996 Constitution in the
Private Sphere ' (1997) 13 SAJHR 44-66 at 65. Footnote omitted .
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an advantage or disadvantage',27 it should be emphasized that the enunciation of the criteria for
determining reasonableness serves an extremely useful purpose in the delicate but formidable task
ofreforming the private common law and represents a direct response to reservations expressed by
Ackermann J in Du Plessis and Others v De Klerk and Another and snuffs out the apprehensions
raised there.
2.3.3 The Indirect Application of Horizontality
While Section 8(2) of the Constitution provides for the direct horizontal application of the Bill of
Rights, Section 39(2) which is substantially the same as its counterpart Section 35(3) ofthe Interim
Constitution can be construed as providing for the indirect application ofthe Bill ofRights between
private persons inter se. This is compatible with the construction which the majority decision gave
to it in Du Plessis & Others v De Klerk & Another." But then Section 35(3) of the Interim
Constitution was interpreted to mean that the Bill of Rights applied indirectly to private law
relationship either to ease the tension in the debate on horizontality, or (and more likely) to justify
the interpretation that the Bill of Rights was intended not to be of general direct horizontal
application but only indirectly." This latter averment is borne out by the contention that if the Bill
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redundant or of peripheral value at the least.30
Now that it is trite that the Bill ofRights applieshorizontally, why then the retention ofthe provision
of Section 39(2) in the Constitution? Some answers may be suggested.
It is generally recognized that the common law, hence private law also, is a coherent system oflaw
and should therefore be interfered with as little as possible . An interpretation that Section 8(2) does
not provide for an unqualified horizontal application of the Bill of Rights is compatible with the
belief that 'an insistence on the direct application of all the fundamental rights entrenched in the bill
ofrights in a sphere that is traditionally governed by the substantive rules ofprivate law could cause
havoc in the South African legal system., 31 It is left to the courts to set out guide lines as to which
rights in the Bill of Rights would come under direct constitutional scrutiny and which indirectly.
Further, it may be advanced that since the development of the common law which includes the
private law has traditionally always been in the domain ofthe High Courts," the Constitution seeks
to avoid a radical departure from such a tradition. Besides, it would serve to avoid the 'egregious
caricature'" that an unqualified application would present. From the above, it may be said that the
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legislation, allows for judicial manoeuvering which in turn allows not only for the incremental
development and amelioration ofthe common law by way Section 39(2) but also for both a radical
application and, if necessary , development of it by the courts in terms of Section 8(3) .
Alternatively, it may be argued that the Constitution seeks every attempt to constitutionalize all law
and conduct within the ambit of the Constitution as the supreme law of the land. That this is not a
far-fetched notion is manifest in Section 39(2) which mandates not only every court but every
tribunal or forum to promote the spirit, purport and objects ofthe Bill ofRights when interpreting
any legislation, and when developing the common law or customary law. Section 39(2) is an
imperative and prescriptive injunction on these institutions in that they 'must promote' the spirit,
purport and objects ofthe BillofRights as compared with Section 35(3) ofthe Interim Constitution
which required only courts to merely have 'due regard ' to the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill
ofRights . The imperative also is indicative that should a court, tribunal or forum not promote the
spirit, purport and objects ofthe Bill ofRights when there are grounds for it in the development of
the common law and customary law, then the matter should be subject to review or appeal to a
higher forum.
However, the least that could be said of the retention of Section 39(2) is that procedurally where
the constitutional issue before a court is one that does not directly engage the common law,
alternatively where the issuebetween two private persons is the common law which does not directly
violate or challenge a fundamental right, then Section 39(2) provides the vehicle through which a
court may indirectly infuse the development ofthe common law or customary law with the values
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and norms inherent in the Constitution. Horizontal seepage (Drittwirkung) is thus maintained. 34
2.3.4 Horizontality and Standing
Before a litigant is allowed to pursue an action in court, it is a material requirement that he must not
only establish a cause of action but also the capacity to litigate ie. he must establish locus standi in
iudicio . Thus at common law in civil litigation, traditionally a litigant must establish that he has a
personal, sufficient and direct interest in the issue before the court and in the relief he seeks.
Ordinarily these would not be highly contentious between private litigants in private law but proved
to be more problematic where institutions acted in a representative capacity on behalf of its
members."
Section 38 of the Constitution confers the right on anyone listed thereunder to approach a
competent court for relief whenever a right in the Bill ofRights has been infringed or threatened.
The persons who may approach a court are -
(a) anyone acting in their own interest;
(b) anyone acting on behalf of another person who cannot act in their own name;
(c) anyone acting as a member of, or in the interest of, a group or class of persons;
(d) anyone acting in the public interest; and
(e) an association acting in the interest of its members.
34
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This section apart from a rewording, is identical in content to its counterpart in the Interim
Constitution, namely Section 7(4)(a) and (b).
The question of standing has been canvassed and probably settled in Ferreira v Levin NO And
Others And Vryenhoek And Others v Powell NO And Others" where the court examined the locus
standi oflitigants within the context ofthe Constitution. Although writing for the Court, Ackermann
J, dissenting, took the narrow and traditional view of standing in that a litigant must show that he
has a direct interest by reason that a right has actually been infringed or threatened to be infringed,
Chaskalson P with whom the majority concurred on this issue adopted a more expansive and
liberalist notion of standing.
The learned judge adopted a broad approach to standing as being'consistent with the mandate given
to [the] Court to uphold the Constitution and would serve to ensure that the constitutional rights
enjoy the full measure ofthe protection to which they are entitled ., 37 Following Canadian case-law
precedent," Chaskalson P held that a person acting in his or her own interest need merely show that
a right in the Bill of Rights is infringed or threatened with infiingement in order to engage a court
and need not be a person whose constitutional right has in fact been infringed or threatened. What
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be for the courts to decide what a sufficient interest would be in the circumstances.39
This too was substantially the view of0 'Regan J although citing the actio popularis ofRoman law
as envisaged in Section 7(4) (b) (v) as the appropriate provision for standing in that case . What is
particularly interesting is that she too cautions against too facile an approach to standing and adds
that while a person may act in the public interest, such a person must show sufficient interest that
he or she is acting genuinely in the public interest and sets out certain criteria for determining a
genuine interest," to wit, whether there is another reasonable and effective manner in which the
challenge can be brought; the nature ofthe relief sought , and the extent to which it is ofgeneral and
prospective application; and the range of persons or groups who may be directly or indirectly
affected by any order made by the court and the opportunity that those persons or groups have had
to present evidence and argument to court." This certainly does not indicate too generous and
expansive an approach if adopted as criteria by the courts.
While it is to be expected that, as far as the horizontal application ofthe Bill ofRights is concerned,
private persons acting in their own capacities where their rights are directly infringed will generally
be the litigants, nothing in Section 38 ofthe Constitution precludes any person to make a challenge
whether acting in his or her own interest or in the interest of another on similar, if not , identical
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in respect of the hitherto traditional and conservative approach to standing in common law cases,
it does not in the same breath make for unqualified and frivolous engagement of the courts. What
the courts are expected to do is to infuse the common law rules of standing with the values and
norms underpinning the Constitution.
2.4 Conclusion
Section 8(2) formally engages the Constitution in the adjudication of common law matters which
constitutes the largest body ofprivate law. But while it must be borne in mind that '[t]he injunction
in Section 8(3) [of the Constitution] to develop the common law is hardly a revolutionary initiative
[as the] Courts are continuously engaged in the development of the common law,42 and while the
courts have always developed the common law with reference to public policy, the boni mores and
legal convictions ofthe community, these were done against the backdrop ofa legal system premised
on parliamentary sovereignty and legal positivism. What horizontality now means is that in the
adjudication of common law disputes between private person revolving around property, contract
and delict would henceforth be informed by the order of values and norms enshrined in the
Constitution. In effect it envisages the constitutionalization ofthe common law in that the courts will
have to develop new causes of action and more so new remedies previously sought in Roman and
Roman-Dutch law and even English law predicated on legal positivism. It envisages a reformulation
of the common law - a common law possibly 'trapped within the limitations of its past' and
'interpreted in conditions of social and constitutional ossification.,43
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However, the extent to which the application ofhorizontality will make inroads into existing areas
of substantive law and zones of private autonomy have yet to be plumbed. Guidance from the
constitutional jurisprudence offoreign countries especially the 'state action' cases of the American
Supreme Court may prove to be particularly instructive. Another matter of interest is that while
Section 8(3) of the Constitution makes provision for the development of the common law no
mention is made of customary law although Section 39(2) makes provision for its development in
the indirect application of horizontality. This too needs to be plumbed and in attempting this, an
examination ofthe role and function of the judiciary in the interpretation and application of the Bill
ofRights is also necessitated.
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THE HORIZONTAL APPLICATION OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN BILL OF RIGHTS
CHAPTER 3
THE FUNCTION OF THE COURTS AND THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY
IN THE HORIZONTAL APPLICATION OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS
3.1 Introduction
Kentridge AJ relying upon the distinction between the common law and statute law and the
interpretation of the Afrikaans 'wet', concluded that it was not the intention of the legislature that
the Constitutional Court adjudicate over common law issues but that the task of reformulating the
common law was the function of the Supreme Court.'
In his dissent, Kriegler J relying on the interpretation of Section 35(3) of the Interim Constitution
held that all the courts including the Constitutional Court were enjoined in interpreting statutory law
as well as applying and developing the common law and customary law and that in performing this
function the purpose of the Constitution 'is to permeate all that judges do.?
Such differences in legal interpretation is typical of the literalist-cum-intentionalist predilection of
English-trained judges and hence also of the majority of South African judges whose training was
predicated on a legal philosophy imbibing parliamentary supremacy.
Du Plessis And Others v De Klerk And Another 1996 (3) SA 850 para [51-52] at 879-
880.
2
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Although the new text ofthe Constitution' now makes provision for the more explicit function ofthe
courts, these features of the judgment raise important issues in respect of the horizontal application
ofthe Bill ofRights. What would be the function ofthe courts in the horizontal application ofthe Bill,
and what are the implications for the judiciary and the legislature as well as what type of
constitutional interpretation and jurisprudence is to be applied, are some of the aspects that require
examination.
3.2 The Function of the Courts
3.2.1 Testing Power of the Courts
Judicial review and constitutional adjudication are the hallmarks ofany modem democracy predicated
on constitutionalism. This being so the Constitution like its predecessor has provided for a hierarchy
of courts with varying degrees of jurisdiction to test the constitutionality of legislative, executive
and administrative acts and conduct," against the norms and values enshrined in the Constitution.
Although there are other institutions for supporting constitutional democracy like the Human Rights
Commission and the Public Protector,' it is ultimately the courts that are invested and entrusted with
judicial authority and 'testing power' or judicial review in respect ofthe validity ofconstitutional acts
and conduct. The 'testing power' or constitutional review ' implies the right and duty of a court or
courts to interpret authoritatively the constitution of the country, to decide authoritatively the
constitutionality oflaws, executive and administrative acts and, in appropriate cases, to declare such
3
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laws and acts invalid and unenforceable when they conflict with the country's constitution."
3.2 .2 The Inherent Power of the Courts
Unlike its predecessor which made elaborate provisions' for the adjudication of constitutional
matters" including depriving the Supreme Court of Appeal of jurisdiction in such matters," the
Constitution now not only confers constitutional jurisdiction on the Supreme Court of Appeal it
confers also inherent jurisdiction on the Constitutional Court inthe development ofthe common law
in terms of Section 173 of the Constitution. Section 173 provides as follows:
The Constitutional Court , Supreme Court of Appeal and High Courts have the
inherent power to protect and regulate their own process, and to develop the
common law, taking into account the interest of justice.
This overcomes the difficulty presented by Kentridge AJ when he held that the Constitutional Court
did not have the inherent or general jurisdiction in respect of the common law adding that its
jurisdiction '[was] not suited to the exposition of the principles of private law."" The development
of the common law is now no longer within the exclusive jurisdiction of the High Courts only; but
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namely, 'the purpose of the Constitution is to permeate all that judges do.' 11
The least that could be said is that Section 173 of the Constitution is a textually literal and
unequivocal confirmation that the Constitutional Court, together with the High Courts, now has
inherent jurisdiction in the development ofthe common law - such determination not being left to a
conjectural interpretation established on an ambiguous text like that of the Interim Constitution. It
is submitted that the confirmation of an inherent jurisdiction is consonant with the operation of
horizontality.
At this stage it might be prudent to examine the construction that the High Court gave to the
jurisdiction of the courts in developing the common law. In Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle
AccidentFundI2 the Court examined the meaning ofdevelopment ofthe common law with reference
to Sections 8(3) and 39(2) ofthe Constitution. It held that the connotation regarding the meaning of
development was the same in both sections. The Legislature had not intended to confer on the courts
a general power ofdevelopment of the common law; although the courts could develop the common
law, it did not mean that the courts could eliminate or alter the common law. Rather where the
common law was silent, it was left to the courts to amplify it in order to give effect to a right where
the legislature had not done so.
It is submitted that this is so where institutions other than the High Courts and the Constitutional
11
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1997 (12) BCLR 1716 (D).
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Court are concerned. These would be the courts lower in status than the High Courts as well other
forums and tribunals. However, if recourse is had to Section 173, the Legislature specifically confers
on the Constitutional Court and the High Courts the inherent power to develop the common law in
the interests ofjustice. It is suggested that these courts indeed have the power to eliminate or to alter
the common law where the Legislature has not done SO.13
3.2.3 The Magistrates' Courts and Other Courts
However, Section 173 by necessary implication excludes the magistrates' courts and other courts in
exercising inherent power in the development of the common law. It is in apparent conflict with
Section 39(2) ofthe Constitution which enjoins every court, tribunal or forum to promote the spirit,
purport and objects of the Bill of Rights when interpreting legislation, and when developing the
commonlaworcustomary law. 14 Perhaps the anomaly could be written away ifthe word 'developing'
could be construed as meaning 'applying' as was the case with the counterpart of Section 39(2) of
the Constitution, namely Section 35(3) of the Interim Constitution. Section 39(2), if so construed
and premised upon the fact that it is traditionally the duty ofthe High Courts to develop the common
law, effectively limits the ambit ofthe application ofSection 35(3) ofthe Interim Constitution which
Kriegler J interpreted as mandating what all courts, including the Constitutional Court, do when there
is no direct infringement or claim of an infringement of a right protected under the Bill ofRights.
But again Section 173 of the Constitution would be in conflict with Section 8(3) which mandates a
13
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court of law to apply ,or if necessary to develop, the common law to the extent that legislation does
not give effect to that right when applying a provision ofthe Bill ofRights horizontally to a natural
or a juristic person. This conflict is apparent if ' a court' is understood to include all other courts,
namely the magistrates' courts and other courts, other than the High Courts and the Constitutional
Court.
A textual examination and interpretation of the relevant provisions ofthe Constitution is compelled
to arrive at a definitive answer.
Section 34 of the Constitution reads as follows :
Everyone has the right to have any dispute that can be resolved by the application
of law decided in a fair public hearing before a court or, where appropriate,
another independent and impartial tribunal or forum.
In terms of this section not only a court or forum but now also a tribunal may be constitutionally
engaged by a person to adjudicate in a dispute brought before it. If this is done, then Section 39(1)
of the Constitution mandates a court, tribunal or forum when interpreting the Bill of Rights to
promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality
and freedom, and when interpreting any legislation and developing the common law or customary
law these institutions must promote the spirit, purport and objects ofthe Bill ofRights. What emerges
from an analysis of these sections in comparison with their counterparts of the Interim Constitution
namely Section 22 and Section 35(1) and (3), is that the reach ofthe Constitution in the adjudication
and settlement ofdisputes has become more expansive. Decisions not only ofthe courts but ofother
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forums as well must now also be informed by the values underlying the Constitution.
While this is so, judicial authority as the ultimate authority is still reposed in the courts in terms of
Section 165(1) of the Constitution. However, specific powers have been reserved for the courts in
terms of Section 172(1) which provides as follows
When deciding a constitutional matter within its power, a court -
(a) must declare that any law or conduct that is inconsistent with the Constitution is invalid to
the extent of its inconsistency;
and
(b) may make any order that is just and equitable, including -
(i) an order limiting the retrospective effect of the declaration of invalidity; and
(ii) an order suspending the declaration of invalidity for any period and on any
conditions, to allow the competent authority to correct the defect.
Other specific powers too have been conferred on the courts in terms of the Constitution. For
example, where a right is alleged to be infringed or threatened with infringement, a court may grant
appropriate relief including the issue of a declaratory order in terms of Section 38. More cogently,
where a provision of the Bill of Rights is applied horizontally only a court is enjoined to apply the
procedure set out in terms ofSection 8(3). No mention is made ofthe other tribunals or forums. This
indicates that where a right in the Bill of Rights is directly challenged, the courts constitute the
ultimate authority. But to state that 'a court' includes courts other than the High Courts and the
Constitutional Court must be deduced with reference to other relevant provisions in the Constitution.
46
Section 170 of the Constitution which reads as follows specifically defines the jurisdiction of the
Magistrates' Courts as well as courts lower in status than a High Court:
Magistrates' Courts and all other courts may decide any matter determined by an
Act of Parliament, but a court of a status lower than a High Court may not enquire
into or rule on the constitutionality of any legislation or any conduct of the
President.
This provision unequivocally confirms the status ofMagistrates'Courts and other lower courts such
as the Small Claims Court, the Short Process Court and the like as being creatures ofstatute wherein
their respective jurisdictions will be prescribed and perhaps even circumscribed. But their jurisdiction
is clearly excluded from enquiring into or ruling on the constitutionality of any legislation or any
conduct ofthe President, a jurisdiction which is vested in the High Courts. 15 Nothing is said of their
jurisdiction in respect of constitutional matters engaging the common law.
Section 170 is in sharp contrast with the equivalent provision ofthe Interim Constitution where it was
unequivocally stated that in any proceedings before such courts i.e. the lower courts, ifit was alleged
that any law or provision of such law was invalidon the ground of its inconsistency with a provision
of the Constitution, the court should decide the matter on the assumption that law or provision is
valid." This is absent in Section 170. Absent also is the provision for the postponement and
suspension of proceedings in respect of claims of constitutional invalidity and consequent referrals
of matters to a higher court.
15
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If any uncertainty still exists, then recourse must be had to the transitional arrangements of Schedule
6 of the Constitution to eradicate it. Section 16(6)(a) of Schedule 6 states that after the new
Constitution takes effect and as soon as is practical, all courts including their structure, composition,
functioning and jurisdiction, and all legislation, must be rationalized with a view to establishing a
judicial system suited to the requirements of the new Constitution.
What all this does is to show that the Constitution makes a concerted and compelling demand for the
reformation and restructuring ofsociety. That apart, the more inclusive the jurisdiction ofthe courts,
the lesser the burden on the Higher Courts whether by way ofappeal or by way ofengaging the court
as a court of first instance. Not only that, this conclusion exorcizes the apprehensions ofKentridge
AJ and Ackermann J in that a direct horizontal application would result in the Constitutional Court
being inundated with appeals to reformulate the common law. 17
In the premises, it can be concluded that the new text is far more articulate and succinct in respect
of the courts than was it predecessor which was a labyrinth of copious legal provisions couched in
numerous and even more numerous sub-sections and paragraphs reserving as far as possible
constitutional matters for the ultimate adjudication of the Constitutional Court.
However, the function of these courts in applying and developing the common law in respect of a
right is restricted to the extent that legislation does not give effect to that right. This means then that
the Legislature would also be involved in the development of the common. This accords with
17
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Kentridge AJ's claim that the radical amelioration of the common law has always been the function
of Parliament. 18 It also confirms Sach J's contention that the role of the courts is not to usurp the
function ofthe legislature for to do so would lead to the judicialization ofpolitics which was clearly
not the function of the courts. According to Sachs J, the function of the courts 'is, in the first place
to ensure that legislation does not violate fundamental rights, secondly, to interpret legislation in a
manner that furthers the values expressed in the Constitution and, thirdly, to ensure that common law
and custom outside the legislative sphere is developed in such a manner as to harmonise (sic )with
the Constitution. In this way, the appropriate balance between the Legislature and the Judiciary is
maintained. 19
From the above it can be concluded that the courts having jurisdiction would not only apply and
develop the common law but would also interpret and apply legislation affecting the common law
within the spirit, purport and object ofthe Constitution. The question that arises is whether our courts
are eminently suited for such an exposition ofthe principles ofthe common law vis-a-vis the Bill of
Rights.
3.3 The Role of the Judiciary
3.3. 1 A Crisis ofLegitimacy
The moral imperatives implicit in the horizontal application of the Bill ofRights imposes a duty on
the judiciary to develop a constitutionally sound social jurisprudence and judicial policy that will
18
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reinstate the rule of law premised on logical consistency, legal certainty and uniformity.
During the apartheid era, the judiciary was subordinate and subservient to parliamentary sovereignty;
the law courts were undermined by successive governments which used them 'as instruments of
domination to work injustice, thus creating a crisis of legitimacy in the legal system as a whole. ,20
When recourse is had to the legal tradition ofthis country, it is generally accepted that parliamentary
sovereignty as applied by the apartheid government had a deleterious and stifling effect on the
judiciary and judicial activism. Judicial independence and the growth of judicial activism were
compromised by the 'inarticulate premises' of judges" that either consciously or unconsciously
pandered to the whim and fancy ofa racist government premised upon parliamentary supremacy and
sovereignty as well as legal positivism which was 'invoked as ajurisprudential creed supportive ofthis
approach'." Parliamentary sovereignty and its cognate, legal positivism, did not nurture a culture of
judicial activism and legal realism but rather one that typified a sterile and impotent judiciary.23
The apartheid regime engendered and fostered a legal system identified with a legitimacy crisis" and
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population of South Africa, but to be out of touch with popular needs and notions ofjustice.I" The
predilections of judges coupled with the notion of the 'inarticulat~ premises' was perceived as
perpetuating not only the concept of parliamentary supremacy but worse still a minority white
hegemony predicated on racism. 'The legal order of apartheid [had] brought not only white South
Africa into disrepute. It [had] undermined faith and confidence in the whole South African legal
system.,26
3.3.2 The Judicial Ideology
Although these criticisms against the judiciary were levelled against it by legal academics" in the
context ofthe judiciary's function vis-a-vis the legislature, these criticisms are not wholly inapposite
in the context of the judiciary's function in relation to the reformulation and the development of the
common law. It must be borne in mind that the 'executive-mindedness' ofjudges either consciously
or subconsciously infused in them a judicial ideology that effectively emasculated the rule of law, if
this concept is understood to mean the protection of the fundamental rights of human beings."
However, this ideology was extended by the influence ofother factors such as the social, economic
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3.3.3 The Composition of the Judiciary
Given the above and the fact the present judiciary is still predominantly comprised of white male
judges who received their training and appointments during the apartheid era, it is not unreasonable
to conclude that conservative activism would prevail. But then a radical transformation of the
judiciary is neither practicable nor advisable, this notwithstanding that '[t]he judiciary is not only
believed to be hardly representative of the population of South Africa, but also to be out of touch
with popular needs and notions ofjustice. , 30 That apart , it is probably not reckless to observe that
there is a dearth of suitably qualified and experienced African lawyers that would be available to fill
vacancies on the bench. Alternatively, if there is not, then indiscriminate appointments would lead to
a legitimacy crisis not dissimilar to that which the predominantly white judiciary is faced.
It does appear though that attempts to make the bench more representative has led to undesirable
reactions as evidenced from the Natal bench where a group of judges somewhat precipitously
objected to the appointment ofan African judge by the Judicial Service Commission as Deputy Judge-
President of the KwaZulu-Natal Provincial Division of the High Court." This in turn seems to have
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3.3.4 Judicial Revisionism
However, despite the denunciation ofthe judiciary for its 'executive-mindedness and conservatism'
the most recent example ofwhich is the judgment handed down against the President and is perhaps
a classic example of articulating the 'inarticulate premiss'," Cowling citing Corder states that 'at no
stage has there been "an allegation of conscious or deliberate bias or prejudice by the judiciary".,34
Either this is true or that there is a great deal of reluctance on the part oflegal academics to 'grab the
thistle by the thorn' to criticise the judiciary and face the wrath ofjudges who are generally perceived
to be averse to criticism.35
But the judiciary despite the criticisms levelled against it, does possess the necessary skills, experience
and intellectual capacity to interpret a Bill of Rights. While this may be so, 'a liberal and active
judiciary has not been the predominant legal tradition in South Africa.,36 Given that a cataclysmic
transformation of the judiciary is neither possible nor desirable, what is required though to alter the
mind-set ofparochial and conservative-minded judges is a concerted judicial revisionism that would
activate judicial thinking and constitutional jurisprudential development. Although it is anticipated
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judicial revisionism must transform the judiciary's intellectual and attitudinal inclinations to manifest
creativity, tact, imagination and sensitivity in the interpretation and application of the Bill ofRights.
To re-instate the confidence of the public in the impartiality, neutrality and independence of the
judiciary, judges will be required to develop a judicial framework and policy that will produce a
constitutional jurisprudence for the reconstruction of society.
Since the courts are seen as the sentinel ofthe Constitution, they are entrusted with its interpretation,
protection and enforcement and as such must be perceived as impartial and independent. 'In a society
such as ours in the throes ofgreat social change and constitutional transformation only an imaginative
judiciary with an instinctive sense ofjustice will be able to transcend the forces of social change and
deliver judgements which will be respected by all sections of society.,37
Judicial review as required by the Constitution will create 'the judicial framework and philosophy for
judicial independence and legitimacy, as well as the potential for judicial activism, thereby allowing
the judiciary to facilitate the socio-economic upliftment of disadvantaged communities. 138
3.3.5 The New Legal Order and Constitutional Interpretation
The new constitution heralds a new legal order in South Africa. It brings with it not only a new
philosophy of constitutionalism but also the potential for a new constitutional jurisprudence.
37
38
Opcitn23 515 at 517.
G E Devenish 'The Courts And The Administration Of Justice' 1997 unpublished text University of Natal,
Durban.
54
The Constitution invests the courts with the power and function of judicial review" which
necessitates that all law be examined against the standard ofvalues that are enshrined in the Bill of
Rights in Chapter 2 and where the law is inconsistent with these norms and values, the courts must
declare it either in whole or in part constitutionally invalid.
This power ofjudicial review it is anticipated will infuse into the courts a new interpretative function
that ought to shed the shackles of a positivistic jurisprudence in favour of one premised on judicial
activism and legal realism.
This metamorphosis from a positivistic jurisprudence to one premised on constitutionalism was
prescribed nearly two decades ago when Dugard advocated the adoption of a realist approach
coupled with 'the new relativist natural law, that recognises the intersection oflaw and legal values' .40
This call has been more cogently echoed by other legal academics lately. Devenish envisages that
a value-oriented and a value-coherent approach will engender a 'bold and empirical constitutional
interpretation' and is ofseminal importance 'for bold, exploratory and even provocative judgements'. 41
Johan van der Westhuizen opines that '[a] court which enforces the constitution will have to do more
than merely interpret and apply norms and prescriptions - it must develop a South African legal and
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activism be seen to be an exercise in the attainment ofnot only national security but also of societal
development. In such a way judicial activism inspiredby constitutional values can be regarded a vital
human technology for social change in a society in the throes of transformation. ,43
It is against the backdrop of a newly created society based on democratic values, social justice and
fundamental rights that the courts will be required to interpret the constitution in order to deliver
sociologically and value-based judgements. This function of interpretation would be entirely
consistent and compatible with and in addition to the 'generous and purposive' interpretation as
approved by the constitutional court in S v Zuma And others" in terms of which the values which
are to be considered must be done so with regard to the 'legal history, traditions and usages'" of the
country. This would result in a creative constitutional jurisprudence that will discard the positivistic,
literal and textual interpretative methodology in favour of a purposive methodology established on
the ethical and moral norms encapsulated in the Constitution . It will produce a constitutional
interpretation based on the rich heritage ofSouth African law and will represent a shift from a Euro-
centric jurisprudence and philosophy to one that is Afro-centric in nature and character.
Although there are indications ofjudicial activism," a healthy tension is expected to exist between
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associated with human rights issues either as judges or as legal academics and pursuing a
constitutional jurisprudence predicated on value-based and value-coherent norms would be expected
to set the yardstick in the transition from judicial conservatism to judicial liberalism. Judicial
revisionism and judicial activism can also be stimulated by legal academic activity as well as that by
the role played by lawyers provided that judges should be positively susceptible and sensitive to
judicial scrutiny."
3.3.6 The Judicialisation ofPolitics and the Politicisation of the Judiciary
Another area of contention is that raised by Kentridge AJ and Sachs J regarding the function ofthe
Parliament and the development ofthe common law." The point in issue here is the question of the
judicialisation of politics and conversely the politicisation of the judiciary. Traditionally, the trias
politica comprises the three arms of government, namely the legislature, the executive and the
judiciary with nearly clearly defined spheres of function. However, a degree of tension has always
existed between the legislature and the judiciary where the judiciary has always maintained an attitude
of deference towards the legislature so as not to encroach onto its domain. But this attitude of
deference may be ascribed to the fact that in a state established on parliamentary sovereignity,
parliament and the laws made by parliament were supreme; the function ofthe courts was to interpret
and apply the laws as they were stated. This is legal positivism where the court's power to declare
an act invalid was confined to whether procedure had been followed in the passing ofthe act and not
to the substantive content of the act. This is a characteristic of the Westminster system of
47
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government.
However, the Constitution in Section 8(1) states that the Bill ofRights applies to all law, and binds
the legislature, the executive, the judiciary and all organs of state. This is constitutional sovereignty
and constitutional supremacy where these organs are subject to the values and norms encapsulated
in the Bill of Rights. While the legislature has the power to make laws, the High Courts and the
Constitutional Court have the power ofjudicial review over these laws. It is therefore to be expected
that a judicialisation ofpolitics and conversely a politicisation ofthe judiciary must occur in the sense
that the courts will test the constitutional validity ofthe laws made by Parliament against the norms
ofthe Constitution and where a legislative act does not pass constitutional muster, second-guess that
which the legislature ought to have done." That a tension will continue to exist between the
legislature and the judiciary can be deduced from the provision of Section 8(3) which provides that
in the horizontal application ofthe Bill ofRights, a court must apply the common law and ifnecessary
develop it to the extent that the legislation does not give effect to that right. However, such a tension
cannot be criticized in the context ofconstitutionalism ifthe objective is to maintain democracy and
to achieve social justice and the protection of human rights and freedoms where this objective is
reposed upon the legislature and the judiciary. This is so whether the Bill of Rights is applied
vertically or horizontally as the result will in fact 'involve no substantial consequences. 'so
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3.4 Conclusion
The horizontal application of the Bill of Rights, whether applied directly or indirectly, invokes the
courts to adopt a constitutional hermeneutic that would lead to a legal philosophy and a constitutional
jurisprudence that is permeated by the rule of law.
Dugard 51almost twenty years ago advocated a new approach to law in which he espoused the
adoption of 'legal realism'? as opposed to 'legal positivism' where the application of legal realism
would result in 'the rejection of positivism as a legal creed and the adoption of a realist-cum-value-
oriented approach to the judicial process and civil liberty'.53
The Bill of Rights whether applied directly or indirectly, vertically or horizontally, demands the
development of a 'Grundnorm' or Basic Order of Values that would inform the decisions of the
courts and acts oflegislation in transforming the South African social, political and legal order. What
horizontality does do, however, is to provide the impetus for the accelerated development ofa legal
dynamic that will meet the aspirations ofa heterogeneous society in a new constitutional dispensation
peculiar to the South African context and in providing such an impetus, the existing common law and
African customary law will inevitably come under constitutional scrutiny and possible reformulation.
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THE HORIZONTAL APPLICATION OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN BILL OF RIGHTS
CHAPTER 4
HORIZONTALITY AND A THEORY OF LIBERTY
4.1 Introduction
This chapter seeks to determine the impact and implications which the horizontal application of the
Bill of Rights will have on the South African substantive law. The impact and implications will be
examined in respect of the maintenance of human dignity and democracy; the status of the
public/private dichotomy in the application ofthe Bill ofRights; the function and liabilityofthe State
and the effect on private law.
4.2 Democracy and Human Dignity
The question is: what does the Constitution and the Bill ofRights in particular wish to secure for the
State and its citizenry. Recourse must be had to the founding provisions of the Constitution, namely
Section 1(a) which provides as follows :
The Republic of South Africa is one, sovereign, democratic state founded on the
following values:
(e) Human dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights and
freedoms .
The appeal to democracy and human dignity based on equality and freedom is reverberated
throughout Chapter 2 on the Bill of Rights . Section 7(1) proclaims that the Bill of Rights is the
cornerstone of democracy in South Africa and affirms the democratic values of human dignity,
61
equality and freedom and that in terms ofSection 36(1) the rights in the Bill ofRights may be limited
only if such limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human
dignity, equality and freedom; further that when interpreting the Bill of Rights in terms of Section
39(1), a court, tribunal or forum must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic
society based on human dignity, equality and freedom. '
The South African Constitution is not unique in its appeal to the establishment ofdemocracy through
the protection and maintenance of human dignity based on equality and freedoms. It is highly
emulative of its forerunners in the international field ofhuman rights law. Thus for example, the first
and fifth preambular paragraphs as well as Article 1 of the Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights
makes explicit reference to the inherent dignity and worth of the human person. Whereas other
international instruments too are no different such as the second preambular paragraphs ofboth the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, they recognize that human rights are derived from the inherent dignity of
the human person.'
Similarly, these instruments refer to democracy and to democratic societies founded on the various
enunciated freedoms and rights. For example the freedom ofreligion, expression, and association and
other rights such as the socio-economic and cultural rights reflect the interests of a democratic
Own emphasis.
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society. Foundational to democracy is the inherent dignity of the human person and worth.
From this, it can be stated that the primary objective of the modem state is the establishment and
maintenance ofa democratic state through the recognition and protection ofhuman dignity. But then,
which of these objectives take precedence over the other - democracy over dignity or vice versa?
In these human rights instruments, it is abundantly clear that reference to dignity is not made as a
reference to a right. Rather the reference is to an inherent, innate and fundamental quality of the
human condition. This is paramount. And it is from this quality and condition ofdignity that the rights
and freedoms of the human person flow - thus the right to respect for and protection of dignity, the
right to life, equality and equal protection of the law, and the right to freedom and security of the
person as well as the right to freedom ofexpression, religion, beliefand opinion to mention just a few.
The recognition, enforcement and protection of the rights and freedoms ofthe human person is the
quintessence of democracy - hypothetically even if the state is inhabited by a single individual or
group of them . If this is the thesis, then it would be safe to conclude that the twin concepts of
democracy and dignity must receive the equal protection of the law in the modem state. A fortiori
this then would be the situation in any modern state predicated on democracy, to wit the Republic
ofSouth Africa whose Constitution sanctions the application ofits Bill ofRights in the private sphere
in terms of Section 8(2) .
However, claims to the enforcement and protection ofrights and freedoms in the name ofdemocracy
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or dignity will inevitably lead to the balancing ofcompeting rights and clashing interests. As all rights
and freedoms emanate from a human person's dignity, the state will always be engaged in legislating
either to maintain democracy for the public good or preserving the inherent dignity of its subjects.
That where there is a clash of rights and interests, the courts will inevitably be involved in balancing
not only the interests ofa democratic society vis-a-vis the individual but also between one individual
vis-a-vis another. And in balancing these interests, a court must always be informed by the norms and
values of openness, and democracy based on human dignity, equality and freedom.'
Andrew Clapham" furnishes an example where the protection ofa right is sought to be justified in two
different respects. Thus where a group of protesters wish to use a private shopping precinct (this
being the only forum in town) as a platform for the dissemination ofideas in the community, a court
injunction would be a violation of a constitution's claim to the protection of democracy. However,
where a coven ofwitches demand to speak at a Christian prayer meeting, a court injunction would
not be violative oftheir right as they would have another platform from which to do so. In both these
situations the common right to freedom of expression and democratic participation are sought to be
protected.' In the case of the protesters, an appeal to the protection of the right in the interest of
3
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Section 36(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, Act 108 of
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Andrew Clapham Human Rights in the Private Sphere 1993 at 145- 146.
See John J. Hurley and South Boston Allied War Veterans Council, Petitioners v Irish-
American Gay, Lesbian And Bisexual Group ofBoston 115 S. CT. 2338 (1995). Here
the petitioner Council which was authorized by the City ofBoston to organize and
conduct the St. Patrick's Day - Evacuation Day Parade refused to allow the respondent
GLIB to participate in the event. The GLIB, which was an organization formed for the
purpose of marching in the parade to express its members ' pride in their Irish heritage
as openly gay, lesbian and bisexual individuals and to demonstrate their solidarity with
like individuals, filed a suit in the state court in which it was alleged that the denial to
march violated a state law prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.
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democracy is justified because there is a public element - public element being the public domain for
the collective good. In the case of the witches such public element is absent, hence protection ofthe
right is denied. However, a complete denial of the right to preach would violate their right to the
freedom ofexpression and conscience and accordingly be unconstitutional. From this example then,
in order to avoid the conflict ofhuman rights, it must be established what is the goal ofa right in any
given situation - democracy or dignity. Ifthis is determined, then the 'intractable riddle ofconflicting
human rights, or endless "balancing and weighing" exercises" is avoided.
It is submitted that this is not entirely correct for in the instance where there is a clash of rights
between one individual vis-a-vis another - where one's freedom or right competes with another's
freedom or right, a court may well be engaged in a balancing and weighing exercise where 'a more
gentle adjustment of borders than the use of the shopkeeper's scales" is called for . Thus to take
another example cited by Andrew Clapham" is where a tenant wishes to display a political poster in
his window despite a clause in the tenancy agreement prohibiting this during an election campaign.
Ifthe right at issue is aimed at the protection ofdemocracy and takes place in the public sphere, then
The state court found for GLIB on the basis, inter alia , that the parade lacked any
express purpose . The decision was affmned by the Supreme Judicial Court.
However, the United States Supreme Court reversed the decision on the basis that the
petitioner's protection under the First Amendment entails that a speaker has the
autonomy to choose the content of his own message in the context of a parade which the
Court held to be forms of expression. Thus the petitioners claim to free speech was
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the right should be protected even from purely private violations. However, the right to put up the
poster would probably deserve less protection if the tenant invokes it to display the poster in a
corridor which is not open to the public but accessible to the landlord. The rights at issue would be
the right to freedom of expression of the tenant vis-a vis the right to dignity of the landlord. This
inevitably would call for the delicate balancing of interests. It is submitted that the freedom of
expression in the absence of the public sphere in this context would be trumped by the landlord's
claim to dignity which must be protected.
In Holomisa v Argus Newspapers Limited 9 the High Court in examining the law of defamation
liability, engaged itself in the balancing oftwo competing rights - the right to freedom of expression
and the right to respect for dignity which encompasses the protection of one's reputation. Since the
constitutional scheme gave no ready answer as to which right should predominate over the other, the
Court undertook an assessment of competing values based on proportionality in terms ofwhich the
value whose protection most closely illuminated the constitutional scheme would receive appropriate
protection. In determining the relative place of each right within the overall constitutional scheme,
the implications for democracy ofeach competing right constituted an important consideration in the
balancing and weighing process. The Court held that in modern democratic societies the media must
be free to speak on matters of public importance as freely and openly as could be allowed but not
more freely than other citizens. It concluded that a defamatory statement which related to free and
fair political activity was constitutionally protected, even if false, unless it could be established by the
9
1996 (6) BCLR 836 (W).
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plaintiff that in all the circumstances it was unreasonably made." Effectively the right to dignity was
trumped by the right to freedom of speech and expression.
The task ofbalancing competing values between the right to freedom of expression and the right to
the protection of reputation in the law of defamation liability came before the Supreme Court of
Appeal of South Africa in National Media LimitedAnd Others v Bogoshi, Nthedi Morole. 11 In this
case the Supreme Court ofAppeal had to examine its previous decision of strict liability in claims for
defamation by the media. It acknowledged that the law ofdefamation required a balance to be struck
between the right to reputation and the freedom ofexpression. In recognizing the right to the freedom
ofexpression, it held that it was a modern democratic imperative that the press make available to the
community information in respect of public, political, social, and economic activity. But however,
where publication did take place even if false and defamatory, unlawfulness would not be present if
it could be established that the publication thereof was reasonable in the circumstances. And in
establishing such reasonableness the Court provided guidance by advocating standards of care with
reference to the nature, extent and tone ofthe allegations as well as the reliabilityoftheir source and
the steps taken to verify the information. Accordingly the doctrine of strict liability established in
Pakendorfen Andere v De Flamingh" was rejected. The Court was cautious to state that in rejecting
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Constitution but rather that it rejected a common law principle wrongly interpreted and applied in
Pakendorf
In so far as the weighing of the interests of dignity and freedom of expression was concerned the
Court cited the Constitutional Court's dicta" relating to the right to life and dignity as being the most
important ofall human rights and the source ofall other personal rights . It accordingly distanced itself
from the virtually unfettered paramountcy which the Court in Holomisa accorded to the freedom of
expression. From this it could be concluded that the Supreme Court ofAppeal did not trump the right
to dignity in favour of the right to freedom of expression. What it claimed to have done was to be
informed by the spirit, purport and object ofthe Interim Constitution in applying and developing the
common law in achieving a proper balance between the right to protect one's reputation ( hence
dignity) and the freedom of the press.
It is respectfully submitted that the judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal in Bogoshi correctly
reflects the developing constitutional jurisprudence in respect of the balancing of competing rights .
It should be borne in mind that dignity is a quality and condition ofhuman worth that inheres in every
human being and it is the right to respect for that dignity that must be weighed in the face of other
competing rights rather than dignity itself . A balancing and weighing exercise does not necessarily
entail engaging the limitation provisions ofthe Constitution which in the case offundamentally basic
rights would require the standards of limitation of such rights to be reasonable and necessary. Such
balancing and weighing could well be accomplished by developing the common law within the context
13
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of the spirit, purport and object of the values enunciated by the Constitution.
This then represents the paradigm in which the South African Constitution should operate - a
paradigm established on an 'open democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom' .
In such a paradigm, democracy entails tolerance, openness, pluralism and representativity among
others while dignity will entail individual development and self-realization and fulfilment. These are
the dimensions within which democracy representative ofthe public good and the common weal and
dignity representative of the individual worth and human condition will operate in the modern state
and tensions between these two concepts are inevitable.
4.3 The PubliclPrivate Dichotomy
It is trite that the traditional notion of a bill of rights was to address the issue of the abuse of state
authority and consequently gross human rights violations. This notion spawned the public/private
dichotomy which in turn led to the development of a constitutional jurisprudence which sought to
bring violations by private actors in the private sphere under constitutional review.
4.3 .1 The 'State Action' Doctrine
The 'state action' doctrine of the United States of America is a classic example of the type of
constitutional jurisprudence which this dichotomy produced. The American Bill of Rights are
incorporated in the Amendments to the Constitution but its application has been generally confined
to the public sphere. The constitutional jurisprudence that evolved was always premised on the notion
that the American Constitution was never intended to apply to private actors. That this is so appears
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from judgments ofthe Supreme Court ofAmerica . In Shelley v Kraemer, 14 ChiefJustice Vinson who
delivered the opinion ofthe court stated that the XIV amendment addressed itself only to the states,
and not to private persons and that private persons remained free to discriminate against others even
on the grounds ofrace and colour. This was reiterated twice by Justice Rehnquist who, in delivering
the opinion ofthe court, in Jackson vMetropolitan Edison Co.15 stated that the principle that private
action is immune from the restrictions ofthe XIV amendment was well established and easily stated.
And again as chiefjustice in DeShaney v Winnebago C1Y. Soc. Servs. Dept. 16 he stated that nothing
in the language ofthe due process clause ofthe XIV amendment required the state to protect the life,
liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion of private actors and that its purpose was to
protect the people from the state and not to ensure that the state protect them from each other.
It was mostly within the ambit ofthe XIV amendment ofthe American Constitution which guaranteed
due process and equal protection of the laws that violations of constitutionally guaranteed rights by
private actors were sought to be scrutinized through the application of the 'state action' doctrine.
This doctrine saw the development of state liability by way of some 'public function' or 'nexus' by
the private actor in terms of which government tolerance, acquiesce, encouragement, action or
inaction was deemed to be 'state action'. Thus in terms ofthe 'state action' doctrine an allegation of
a breach ofa fundamental right is sustained only if responsibilityfor the relevant governmental action
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associated with the state. However, it was in Shelly v Kraemer" that the most expansive and
provocative interpretation and application of the 'state action' doctrine was announced. In this case
the Supreme Court ofAmerica held that judicial enforcement ofracially restrictive covenants between
private persons would amount to state action for which the state must be responsible. Effectively this
would result in every private arrangement between private actors being subject to the purview ofthe
constitution which invariably would result in the encroachment ofindividual liberty - a function which
the constitution was not intended to serve.
But such an application has indeed produced contradictions and inconsistencies that has generated
an incoherent and inchoate constitutional jurisprudence. Tribe in his examination and analysis ofthe
' state action' doctrine, concludes that 'despite the precedents, and despite the vocabulary, the
Supreme Court has not succeeded in developing a body of state action "doctrine", a set of rules for
determining whether governmental or private actors are to be deemed responsible for an asserted
constitutional violation.' 18 And further holds that while the Supreme Courts decisions indicate that
'the state action requirement is plainly not an "empty formality" [w]hat is empty is the concept of
state action "doctrine". Because the Supreme Court does not currently have access to a general
theory ofliberty" allocating public and private responsibility, the Court can no longer derive doctrinal
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action decisions fail as doctrine.,20
Other writers too were of the view the 'state action' doctrine was of no value in constitutional
jurisprudence. Chemerinsky in examining the 'state action' doctrine maintains that 'ifthe state action
requirement is jettisoned, courts will directly balance the competing liberties involved in each case.
Such an approach maximizes protection of liberty, replacing the current policy of always choosing
to favor the rights of the private violator over those of the victim.,21
It is evident also from Gunther's 22 analysis of the 'state action' cases, that the Supreme Court of
America had started to circumscribe the scope of the state action concept since the 1970's - a trend
that was continued in the post - 1982 rulings. Gunther attributes '[t]he modern Court's curtailment
of state action coverage ... to the newly recognized, very broad congressional power to deal with
private discrimination ... ., 23 It is perhaps safe to conclude that the 'state action' doctrine becomes
increasingly casuistic, garbled and amorphous as ironically epitomized in DeShaney v Winnebago
CTY. Soc. Servs. Dept." That apart, according to Tribe the 'state action' doctrine holds that one of
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of the Constitution's prohibitions, it stops the Constitution short of pre-empting individual liberty -
of denying to individuals the freedom to make certain choices, such as choices of the persons with
whom they will associate. Such freedom is basic under any conception ofliberty, but it would be lost
if individuals had to conform their conduct to the Constitution's demands.f"
But it does appear that the American courts while acknowledging that constitutional guarantees did
extend to the private sector, would attempt as far as possible to bring private acts of discrimination
under the ambit ofthe 'state action' doctrine. See the headnotes to Edmonson v Leesville Concrete
Company" where it is stated that 'the Constitution's guarantees of individual liberties and equal
protection apply in general only to action by government, and with a few exceptions ... do not apply
to the action of private entities; such a fundamental limitation on the scope of constitutional
guarantees an area ofindividual freedom by limiting the reach ofthe federal law and avoids imposing
on the state, its agencies, or officials responsibility for conduct for which they cannot be blamed; one
great object ofthe Constitution is to permit citizens to structure their private relations as they choose
subject only to the constraints ofstatutory or decisionallaw; the courts, in order to implement these
principles, must consider from time to time where the government sphere ends and where the private
sphere begins; although the conduct of private parties lies beyond the Constitution's scope in most
instances, governmental authority may dominate an activity to such an extent that the participants
must be deemed to act with the authority of the government and, as a result, be subject to
25
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constitutional constraints." this is the jurisprudence of state action, which explores the essential
dichotomy between the private sphere and the public sphere, with all its attendant constitutional
obligations. ,28
By contrast, the South African Constitution demands that while not denying the existence nor the
exercise ofliberty in a democracy, the conduct ofpersons must always conform to the Constitution's
demands ofequality and dignity. In measuring and assessing this conformity, a balancing ofinterests
must be inevitable.29
The South African Constitution binds the legislature, the executive, the judiciary and all organs of
state, as well as natural and juristic persons depending upon the nature of the right and the duty
imposed by the right." Does it mean that the 'state action ' doctrine as espoused in Shelly v Kraemer
should now apply to South African constitutional jurisprudence by reason ofthe fact that the courts
are now bound? It is submitted that it should not as it perpetuates the public/private dichotomy which
should not be the premiss upon which the South African constitutional jurisprudence should be
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reason that it is premised on positivistic jurisprudence but that the Constitution itself states
unequivocally that it applies to all law - whether public or private.32
4.3.2 Canadian Jurisprudence
Canadian jurisprudence although rejecting the American state action doctrine is in itself incoherent
for the application of a bill of rights in the private sphere . The Canadian Supreme Court had
unequivocally stated that the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 'like most written
constitutions, was set up to regulate the relationship between the individual and the Government. It
was not intended to restrain governmental action and to protect the individual. It was not intended
in the absence of some governmental action to be applied in private litigation. ,33 Hence its significant
influence on the judgment of Du Plessis and Others v De Klerk and Another." But however, the
Court held that the 'judiciary ought to apply and develop the principles of the common law in a
manner consistent with the fundamental values enshrined in the Constitution [in respect of] private
litigants whose disputes fall to be decided at common law.,35 In this sense only, can Canadian
constitutional jurispruderice be ofvalue within the South African constitutional context.
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public/private dichotomy must either be rejected for application where a bill of rights is to be applied
within a paradigm premised on the twin concepts of democracy and dignity. Alternatively, at least
where human conduct arising from the exercise of rights enshrined in the Constitution gives rise to
conflicts between private persons, acting inter se, then the public/private divide must be de-
emphasized. It is submitted that this would lead to the formulation of clearer constitutional
jurisprudence in the modern state where new centres ofpower such as corporations and other juristic
persons like medical schemes and insurance houses wield power equivalent to or greater than that of
the state and where what was once state functions are being increasingly privatized." Constitutions
ofthe modern state would require all conduct to be adjudged according to the same standards as the
constitutional provisions and constitutional jurisprudence demand .
4.4 ANew Doctrine
It must be borne in mind that the 'state action' doctrine (or lack of it) and the public/private
dichotomy was developed out of considerations of a positivistic jurisprudence predicated on the
supremacy ofthe state and not on constitutionalism. This is abundantly clear in the majority judgment
of Du Plessis and Others v De Klerk and Another. 37
It is argued that since any doctrine established on the public/private dichotomy would be unsuitable,
it would now be necessary to propose some doctrine which would be suitable for application to a
constitution which applies not only to the public sphere but to the private sphere as well. In order to
36
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construct such a doctrine, an investigation into the apprehensions and limits of the horizontal
application of a bill of rights is compelled.
4.4.1 Limits to the Application of a Bill ofRights in the Private Sphere.
Du Plessis and Others v De Klerk and Another provides the source of analysis and could be
instructive in mooting a doctrine for adoption. Ackermann J was particularly sensitive to the direct
application of the Bill of Rights in the private sphere and to reiterate, expressed the following
limitations to the direct application of the Bill ofRights in the private sphere :"
(a) A direct application of the Bill of Rights would make the law vague and uncertain and is
contrary to the concept of the constitutional state;
(b) A direct application of the fundamental rights to private relations would severely undermine
private autonomy;
(c) A direct application of the basic rights in disputes between private individuals would place
duties on them and necessitate the balancing of competing rights;
(d) A balancing of rights would lead to conflicting decisions by the courts which would result in
numerous appeals to the Constitutional Court in matters that would otherwise be of a
38
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commercial nature and would cast onto the Constitutional Court the formidable task of
reforming the private common law
and
(a) A direct application of the basic rights would turn the Constitution, contrary to its historical
evolution ofconstitutional individual rights protection, also into a code ofcivilobligations for
private individuals with no indication as to how clashing rights and duties are to be resolved
or how clashing rights are to be balanced.
While most ofthese concerns have been resolved by the Constitutional Court's certification that the
new text of the Constitution has direct horizontal application," there are two matters that yet have
to be resolved . These are that in the absence ofa doctrine, the applicationofthe Bill ofRights would
make the law vague and uncertain, and that the direct application of the fundamental rights would
severely undermine private autonomy. Perhaps to condense the problem, it could be said that the law
would be vague and uncertain precisely for the reason that private autonomy would be undermined
and this is contrary to the concept of the constitutional state.
The formulation of a doctrine must of necessity depend on the understanding of the concepts of
private autonomy, the constitutional state and a theory of law.
4.4.1.1 Private autonomy
The human person in the natural state is born free and equal. This freedom and equality is the
39
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expression of a person's inherent dignity. Dignity therefore must be understood in this context as an
integral and fundamental human condition sustained on equality and freedom. Thus the human person
is free to associate with any other person on an equal footing. And in this association other legal
relationships may emerge giving rise not only to rights and corresponding duties but to more
complex corre1atives such as privilege, power and immunity." Ifthis privilege, power and immunity
is understood as the autonomy in terms of which a person exercises his liberty to associate with
}
whomsoever he chooses freely and equally whether capriciously or whimsically, then such a person
must enjoy the respect and protection of this autonomy. The corollary must also be true, namely,
where this liberty encroaches on the equality and freedoms of others and thereby infringes their
dignity, primafacie, it ought not to be protected at all or that the protection must be limited ..
It is in view ofthe above thesis that Kriegler J was prompted to declare that '[u]nless and until there
is resort to law, private individuals are at liberty" to conduct their private affairs exactly as they
please as far as the fundamental rights and freedoms are concerned. [Thus] a landlord is free to refuse
to let a flat to someone because ofrace, gender or whatever; a white bigot may refuse to sell property
to a person ofcolour; a social club may black-ball Jews ...; [a]n employer is at liberty to discriminate
on racial grounds in the engagement of staff; ... [but] none ofthem can invoke the law to enforce or
protect their bigotry. [And it is] the State, as the maker ofthe laws, the administrator oflaws and the
40
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interpreter and applier of the law, is bound to stay within the four cornets of [the Bill ofRights]. , 42
Thus the question: what State and what law?
4.4.1.2. The Constitutional State and State Responsibility
The Constitution dictates the creation and maintenance of a democracy founded on human dignity,
equality and freedom ." The Constitution through its Bill ofRights confirms and reaffirms the basic
fundamental rights of its subjects the so-called natural or first generation rights, as well as newer
rights such as the socio-economic or second generation rights and environmental rights or third
generation rights." The Constitution declares itself the supreme law ofthe land" and commands the
State to respect , protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights. 46 And not only that , it
proclaims that the Bill of Rights applies to all law and binds the legislature, the executive, the
judiciary and the all organs of state .47 The notion of a constitutional state is the state which creates
the law and through the maintenance of the law sustain a legal order.
From this it can be said that it is not only the courts but that the State too, at whatever level, is
responsible for legislation that will entail the complex process ofbalancing clashing rights . While it
42
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may be argued that the ultimate objective of the State is the achievement of a 'welfare state'
established on the concept ofmeliorism, democracy demands the eradication ofunfair discrimination
and the protection ofhuman dignity. But the eradication ofdiscrimination could mean the protection
of the right to equality but the denial ofthe right to freedom . It is argued that the denial of freedom
by the courts and the State would entail the encroachment on the right to liberty and private
autonomy. Thus the claim to equality and equal protection of the law may mean that a racially
restrictive covenant is invalid. Similarly, a testator's testamentary disposition in terms ofwhich only
males are to be the beneficiaries is invalid and so too will a lessor's offer of lease to a particular
cultural group. In all these cases and cases of a similar nature, the claim to private autonomy and
liberty will be denied. The questions that arise are whether the right to freedom and hence a zone of
autonomy must succumb always to the claim of equality where some form of discrimination is
apparent thereby asserting that a claim to equality supercedes a competing claim of liberty. How is
the constitutional impasse to be resolved?
4.4.1.3. A Theory of Liberty and a Doctrine of Law
A resort to the Constitution and what it provides for is yet again compelled. It has been stated above"
that the Constitution appeals to democracy and human dignity based on equality and freedom. In
doing so it provides for the protection, promotion and fulfilment ofthe fundamental rights in its Bill
of Rights. But the Constitution also provides for the limitation of these rights according to the
standard set out in the Bill.49 It can therefore be envisaged that where there is a clash of rights, as
48
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there must be, the legislature or the courts may be required to prefer one right over another. Thus in
competing claims to equality and liberty, it is possible that the one may be limited in preference to the
other. But the crux of the matter is whether a claim to the right of liberty and private autonomy can
be preferred to a competing claim to the right of equality. If the attainment of equality implies the
eradication offorms ofdiscrimination then the preference ofthe right to liberty and private autonomy
implies the recognition ofcertain forms ofdiscrimination. It is submitted that a theory ofliberty exists
which recognizes that there are inviolable spheres ofprivate autonomy and the right to privacy and
that if accepted would resolve the constitutional impasse between the competing claims to equality
and liberty.so
That the theory of liberty and the sphere of private autonomy is implicit in and integral to the right
ofprivacy has been recognized by the majority in Bernstein And Others v Bester NO And Others. SI
Here Ackermann J writing for the Court considered the content ofthe right to privacy with reference
to section 13 of the Interim Constitution which accords substantially with Section 14 of the
Constitution.52
With reference to international debates and constitutional jurisprudence the learned justice holds that
while it is a truism that no right is to be considered absolute since every right is always already limited
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only the inner sanctum of a person that would be shielded from erosion by the conflicting rights of
the community. This inner sanctum relates to a person's family life, sexual preference and home
environment. 53
The learned justice's observations ofGerman constitutional jurisprudence is particularly instructive.
It has been held by the Federal Constitutional Court that there is a constitutional obligationto respect
the sphere of intimacy of individuals. This is based on the right to the unfettered development of
personality and in determining the content and ambit of this fundamental right, regard must be had
to the inviolability of dignity which must be respected and protected by the judiciary. The judgment
notes also that a very high level of protection is given to an individual's intimate personal sphere of
life which includes an untouchable sphere ofhuman freedom that is beyond any interference from any
public authority. This implies a most intimate core of privacy in respect of which no justifiable
limitation can take place.54
A theory ofliberty envisages those very intimate fundamental rights to privacy and private autonomy
which inhere in the human dignity. It includes those that are traditional and fundamental even if
motivated by caprice or whim. Such a theory of liberty justifies the recognition of the right to fair
discrimination in exercising the freedom to associate or not to associate, the freedom to the exclusive
use and enjoyment of private property and the freedom to testate as well as all other freedoms that
invoke rights of an intimate and personal nature. Thus the choice of one's marriage partner, one's
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neighbourhood or neighbour, one's choice of a sperm with reference to ethnic origin from a sperm
bank, a testator's choice ofa testamentary disposition preferring male beneficiaries - all are resolved
by a doctrine oflaw that recognizes the right to privacy and private autonomy premised on a theory
of liberty.
In as much as the limitation clause unequivocally implies that the Constitution does not require the
State to outlaw all forms of discrimination nor to ensure total equality, it is submitted that such a
theory ofliberty is tolerant ofdiscrimination even where the victim 'suffers a minor limitation and a
limited unpublic indignity'55 and is consonant with the assertion that the State cannot be responsible
for a discrimination that itself cannot prevent. 56 Equally, a theory of liberty would be intolerant of
unfair discrimination therefore providing no recognition and constitutional protection such as where
the discrimination is 'public, blatant, and widespread; the inequality and indignity therefore notorious
and extensive, with important communal consequences.,57 Thus a landlord or a white bigot who do
not deal with persons of colour equally as much as a hotelier or a restaurateur whose right of
admission is invoked to serve blacks only cannot seek constitutional protection by asserting a claim
to privacy and private autonomy and property rights . Rights in this sense are not co-extensive with
those of a homeowner who may regulate the admission of guests. Claims to absolute immunity or
inviolability can be denied and is consonant with the remarks ofJustice Black when he asserted that
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up his property for use by the public in general, the more do his rights become circumscribed by the
statutory and constitutional rights of those who use it. Thus, the owners of privately held bridges,
ferries, turnpikes and railroads may not operate them as freely as a farmer does his farm. Since these
facilities are built and operated primarily to benefit the public and since their operation is essentially
a public function, 58 it is subject to state regulation.,59 From this it can be concluded that the more
a private act by a private actor assumes the character of a public function and the more he lays claim
to privacy and private autonomy and rights to property, the more they are attenuated and eroded.
This is clearly enunciated in Bernstein where Ackermann J states that once a person moves into
communal relations and activities not only does the scope ofhis personal space shrinks but that the
inviolable intimate core of privacy is left behind.60
What is posited here is a public function doctrine that is not equated to but is also not entirely
dissimilar from the state action, government action or government function doctrine. The idea is to
avoid the strict dichotomy ofthe public/private divide and the 'state action' doctrine. This inevitably
would entail huge multi-nationals, national corporations and other private institutions such as trade
unions, churches, pressure groups and the like which are perceived as new centres of power" and
which pose significant threats to private autonomy in the horizontal plane and in respect of socio-
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constitutional liabilityas required by the Constitution in respect ofstate institutions. However, Johan
van der Vyfer maintains that 'autonomy is a juristic person's right to privacy and is to such social
entities what the right to life is to a natural person'S and therefore non-state institutions should not
be subject to the same intrusive standards of constitutional scrutiny as state institutions.
However, it is not inconceivable that a claim to private autonomy and hence discrimination by
institutions such as social clubs entertaining only Jews, males only or females only sporting clubs,
religious societies and cultural groups as well as gay societies would receive constitutional protection.
Perhaps critical factors as the number of members , the objectives, purpose and function and the
degree of intimacy and historical context and a national philosophy may all be criteria for the
determination ofimmunization from constitutional attack. In this regard Kriegler J's assertions" may
be a half-truth in that a white bigot or a racially restrictive social club may seek and obtain
constitutional protection. And those of Ackermann J64 may be less so for a theory of liberty would
permit intrusion into spheres ofprivate autonomy hitherto insulated against constitutional scrutiny.
4.4.2 A Theory ofLiberty and the South African Constitution
Whether a theory of liberty, if accepted, can be applied within the South African context can be
gleaned from the Constitution itself It is submitted that the Constitution does have the breadth and
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and consonance with the Constitution.
The equality provision of the Constitution'? spells out the ambit of the right of equality and equal
protection of the law. It makes provision for legislation that will protect or advance persons
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination." It makes provision that the State may not unfairly
discriminate on a number ofgrounds including but not limited to race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital
status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief,
culture, language and birth." And similarly but separately provides that no person may unfairly
discriminate and that legislation must be enacted" to prevent or prohibit unfair discrimination." It
concludes that discrimination on the grounds so listed is unfair unless established that it is fair."
Equalityjurisprudence and doctrine has been the subject ofdevelopment by the Constitutional Courts
in a series ofjudgments. In Brink v KitshoffN07l, it was cautioned that, while most constitutional
instruments were aspirational towards total equality, national jurisprudential and philosophical
considerations of equality had to be construed within the South African context." This would entail
65
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developing an equality jurisprudence in terms not only ofthe context ofthe Constitution but also with
reference to the historical background of South Africa. Karthy Govender maintains that '[t]he new
constitutional order has, at its core, a commitment to substantive equality and seeks to map out a
vision for the nation based on this commitment. This vision reflects the need to remedy the ills ofthe
past and to establish a less divided society in which a constitutional democracy can survive and
flourish. ,73
In President of the Republic ofSouth Africa And Another v Hug074, the Court in examining the
equality provision stated in particular that since unfair discrimination was expressly prohibited, there
was a need to develop a concept of unfair discrimination which recognizes that although a society
which affords each human being equal treatment on the basis of equal worth and freedom that goal
could not be achieved by insisting upon identical treatment in all circumstances.75
But it was in Prinsloo v Van Der Linde And Another" that the Court applied itself more cogently
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Harksen v Lane NO And Others." Although these judgments related to the constitutionality of
statutory provisions, the Court's decision are apposite to the conduct of private parties.
The Court in Prinsloo v Van Der linde AndAnother took as its point of departure the adoption of
the 'idea ofdifferentiation' as the factor that lies at the heart of equality jurisprudence" rather than
'discrimination', the latter having acquired a pejorative meaning within the context ofthe history of
South Africa." The Court's interpretation and application of the right to equality and equal
protection of the law may be summarized thus:80
(a) Does the provision (conduct) differentiate between people or categories of people? If so, does the
differentiation bear a rational connection to a legitimate purpose? If it does not then there is a
violation of the right to equality. Even if it does bear a rational connection, it might nevertheless
amount to discrimination.
(b) Does the differentiation amount to unfair discrimination? This requires a two stage analysis:
(i) Firstly, does the differentiation amount to "discrimination"? If it is on a specified ground,
then whether or not there is discrimination will depend upon whether, objectively, the
ground is based on attributes and characteristics which have the potential to impair the
fundamental dignity of persons as human beings or to affect them adversely in a seriously
comparable manner.
(ii) If the differentiation amounts to "discrimination", does it amount to "unfair
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will be presumed. Ifon an unspecified ground, unfairness will have to be established bythe
complainant. The test of unfairness focuses primarily on the impact of the discrimination
on the complainant and others in his or her situation. If, at the end of this stage of the
enquiry, the differentiation is found not to be unfair, then there will be no violation of the
right to equality.
(c) If the discrimination is found to be unfair then a determination will have to be made as to whether
the provision (conduct) can be justified under the limitations clause.
While it must be accepted that the right to equality free ofdiscrimination is ofcardinal interest to the
Constitution, it does allow for fair discrimination either at the instance ofthe State or a person. What
is particularly striking is that the Constitution specifically mandates the State to promulgate legislation
as far as persons are concerned to prevent or prohibit unfair discrimination. This establishes that the
Constitution recognizes the common law right to discriminate emanating from the fundamental rights
of liberty, property and association but that legislation is required to limit the unfettered exercise of
this right. This envisages that the State would legislate generally against modern centres of power
such as multi-nationals and the like. But that the Constitution recognizes a theory ofliberty and those
intimate zones ofautonomy from where even the State is precluded entry, is captured in section 9(5)
which declares all discrimination as unfair unless it can be established that it is fair.
What section 9(5) indicates is that the liberty to discriminate exists provided that if resort to law is
sought for protection, it must be established that it is fair. It is submitted that such a provision has
implications vastly different from the situation where the Constitution would have required the party
seeking protection to have relied upon the limitation clause to trump the other party's claim to
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equality and equal protection and benefit of the law. The implication also is that the Constitution
recognizes those very intimate zones where the right to liberty substantiated by a claim to fairness is
preferred over a competing claim to equality without limiting it. It shows too that where
discrimination is involved equality ranks before freedom unless otherwise established. However,
where a party's right to discriminate is prevented or prohibited by legislation, such a party may yet
seek constitutional protection by reliance on the justification of fairness in terms of section 9(5)
together or alternatively with reliance on the limitation clause of section 36 - a two pronged attack
therefore.
The Constitution is cognizant too ofthose deeply personal areas ofprivate autonomy established by
tradition or a system ofcommon law. Section 15( 3) with reference to freedom ofreligion, beliefand
opinion reads :
(i) This section does not prevent legislation recognizing -
(i) marriages concluded under any tradition, or a system of religious, personal or
family law; or
(ii) systems of personal and family law under any tradition, or adhered to by persons
professing a particular religion.
(ii) Recognition in terms of paragraph (a) must be consistent with this section and the other
provisions of the Constitution.
These provisions are clear indications that the Constitution recognizes those systems ofpersonal and
family law that have evolved out of traditions as old as man himself or have been sanctified by
religious beliefs. In short, they represent relationships that are deeply personal and intimate, the
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quintessence of which is liberty.
That the Constitution does not wish to constitutionalize all of the common law and customary law
in terms of which fundamental rights and freedoms are recognized is evident from section 39(3)
which states that :
The Bill ofRightsdoesnot deny the existence of anyother rights or freedoms that
are recognized or conferredby the commonlaw, customary law or legislation, to
the extent that they are consistentwith the Bill.
4.4 .3 Constitutional Damages
The Constitution through its covenant of rights imposes upon the State the duty to administer its
system of laws not only for the public or collective good and democracy but for the individual and
human dignity. The traditional application of a bill of rights imposed liabilities on the state for
violations ofhuman rights where the state was the perpetrator. This was endorsed in Du Plessis and
Another v De Klerk and Others. 81 The question therefore is whether the State can be held liable for
its omissions or failure to act with regard to violations in the private sphere between private
individuals where the State is not the actor.
State liabilityfor violations ofhuman rights in the horizontal sphere has been recognized. In Andrew
Clapham this doctrine ofliabilityis referred to as the 'ecological liability' ofthe state . This 'ecological
liability' of the state is established on the basis that there is a changing attitude in legal and social
81 Op cit n 34 para [49] at 878-879 .
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thinking arising from the complexity ofa changing social fabric . The changes in the legal-political and
socio-economic spheres requires the state to protect rights and freedoms in the private sector and not
only from interference by public authorities as is the traditional view. This implies that a state would
have both negative and positive obligations in this regard.82
'Ecological liability' ofthe State for failure to protect human rights in the private sphere is recognized
in the case-law of the European Commission on Human Rights and the European Court ofHuman
Rights." The state of Ireland" was held liable for failure to protect a woman from physical abuse by
her alcoholic husband by denying her access to justice and the Netherlands" for failure to protect a
16-year-old mentally handicapped girl from sexual abuse in that there was a gap in Dutch law that
did not allow the father or his daughter to bring a criminal prosecution against the perpetrator. This
liability was established on the provisions of Article 8(1) of the European Convention of Human
Rights which accords substantially with the freedom and security of the person in terms of section
12(1)(c) of the South African Constitution.
The question of constitutional damages which is unknown in South African jurisprudence was
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law delictual damages, claimed for constitutional damages which would include an amount for the
vindication of the infringed right in question and for punitive damages. The claim for constitutional
damages was rooted in the ' appropriate relief contemplated in section 7 (4) of the Interim
Constitution for the infringement or threatened infringement ofa right. 87 While the Court recognized
that the relief contemplated was essentially relief which was required to protect and enforce the
Constitution," great dubiety was expressed in respect of 'punitive or exemplary damages'. All the
members of the Court agreed that punitive damages should not in the particular case be awarded as
the common law damages claimed would be an adequate vindication ofthe applicant's constitutional
right if he succeeded.
However, while the Court accepted that it had the responsibility to "forge new tools" and shape
innovate remedies," '[c]laims for damages not purporting to provide a cent for compensation, but
with the different object of producing some punitive or exemplary result, have never ... been
authoritatively recognized in modern South African law. ,90 While this may be so, the question of
punitive damages in the absence of any other remedy including common law and statutory has not
been entirely ruled out. Didcott J himself observes that since the Bill of Rights is of horizontal
application, sources ofpower other than the State such as multi-nationals would be targets for heavy
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thought appropriate at some future time, their introduction into our law must ... be not ofjudicial
innovation but of legislative action." Kriegler J too recognizes that punitive damages may constitute
appropriate relief' [p]rovided the remedy serves to vindicate the Constitution and deter its further
infringement. ,92
It is submitted that while the courts being sensitive to the scarce resources ofthe State would for the
time-being be reluctant to award damages against it," the South African Constitution admits ofsuch
state liability especially in regard to those rights where the Constitution expressly provides for
national legislation to regulate and to give effect to those rights such as equality and prevention of
and protection from unfair discrimination," access to information" and just administrative action"
and perhaps where legislation is required to recognize certain traditional rights .97
The extent of state liability it is submitted cannot be unlimited. While the State is responsible for the
creation and maintenance ofa legal order, it cannot be held liable for every violation ofa human right
in the private sphere. It is suggested that the where there is a positive obligation on the State to
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compensation may be imputed to it. The degree of liability can be assessed with reference to the
current philosophy ofthe State at any given time with regard to balancing the individual's interest vis-
a-vis with those ofthe interests ofthe community as a whole and what the State wishes to accomplish
at that time with regard to the socio-political or socio-economic needs of the State for the
Constitution would have as little or as much weight as the prevailing political culture would afford
4.5 Conclusion
A theory of liberty does not mean that equality would be trumped. What it means is that while the
State's function, given its historical philosophy of repression by discrimination, is to attain towards
nearly total equality, there will be instances where a zone of autonomy should be preferred to
equality .
The notion ofliberty endorses the view that there are areas where the Constitution cannot go without
claiming at the same time that there areas or zones of autonomy and privacy beyond constitutional
review. It supports the view that the Constitution is the supreme law ofthe land and that no right is
not subject to it.
A theory ofliberty does not mean that a claim to liberty will enjoy equal protection and equal merit
in all situations. 'Differences in circumstances beget differences in law.,99 A theory ofliberty is as old
98
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as man himself and the law. It has always engaged the courts in balancing of rights when there has
been a clash ofinterests. This is well known more particularly in the law ofdelict where matters such
as the boni mores and public policy have always preoccupied the courts in their adjudication.
'In the end, whether the freedom to discriminate may surpass the claim to equality and how "neutral"
the forces of law may be in that conflict can only be decided in the light of a complex of
considerations of varying import and relevance. The balance may be struck differently at different
times, reflecting differences inprevailingphilosophies and the continuing movement from laissez-faire
government toward welfare and meliorism. The changes in prevailingphilosophy themselves may sum
up the judgment ofjudges as to how the conscience of our society weighs the competing needs and
claims of liberty and equality in time and context ... .'100
100
LouisHenkin op cit n 50 at 494.
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THE HORIZONTAL APPLICATION OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN BILL OF RIGHTS
CHAPTER 5
AFRICAN CUSTOMARY LAW AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS
5.1 Introduction
Although regarded as a 'Cinderella subject [which was] more likely to have been a deliberate policy
to exclude Africans and their institutions from the mainstream of South African law' 1 and although
whatever was recognized was 'marginalised and allowed to degenerate into a vitrified set of norms
alienated from its roots in the community", by recognizing customary law the new constitutional
order in South Africa indeed takes cognizance of legal and cultural pluralism.
Whether incorporated by reason of political rhetoric or expediency or both, the truth of the matter
is that customary law will come under constitutional scrutiny. With reference to the horizontal
application ofthe Bill ofRights, this chapter will seek to establish that aspect ofcustomary law which
is sensitive and responsive to such an application and willconsider proposed legislation impacting on
such a sensitivity and responsiveness.
T W Bennett ' The Compatibility of African Customary Law and Human Rights ' in
Bennett et al (eds) Af rican Customary Law 1991.
2
Per Mokgoro J in Du Plessis and Others v De Klerk and Another 1996 (3) SA 850 para
[172] at 192. See also Ch 1 supra at 3.3 and I Currie ' Indigenous Law' in Chaskalson et
al (eds) Constituional Law ofSouth Af rica 1996 36.1 at 36-1.
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5.2 Provisions of the Constitution and Customary Law
5.2.1 Indigenous Law, Customary Law and Custom Distinguished
The Interim Constitution made references to indigenous law and customary law.' But however, the
new text of the Constitution of South Africa makes reference to customary law only and not to
indigenous law either for the reason that they are synonymous" or alternatively to avoid the enormous
enterprise' of deciding which rules ofthe customary law ofAfricans reside in legislation and which
remain partly or wholly unwritten'. 5
With reference to the text, the Constitution" specificallyrecognizes the existence and observance of
customary law within the context of the institution, status and role of traditional leaders7 but that a
traditional authority which observes a system ofcustomary law may function subject to any applicable
legislation and customs, which includes amendments to, or repeal of, that legislation or those
customs." Further there is an imperative that the courts must apply customary law when that law is
applicable, subject to the Constitution and any legislation that specificallydeals with customary law."
It is evident from these provisions that the Constitution consciously distinguishes between customary
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and have been elevated to the status of the law by way of legislation and judicial precedent. It is
suggested therefore that all that is autochthonous or indigenous in practice is not necessarily
customary law.IQ
5.2.2 Application
The Constitution is quite clear that the application ofcustomary law lieswithin the institution ofthose
traditional authorities who observe a system ofcustomary law" subject to any legislation. As far as
legislation is concerned, the national legislature shares concurrent competence with the provincial
legislature in respect of legislating, amending or repealing customary law and customs.12 Essentially
then, the application and jurisdiction of customary law is vested in state recognized traditional
authorities at local government level.13
The judgment in Bangindawo And Others v Head ofthe Nyanda Regional Authority AndAnother"
is particularly instructive in this regard. It held that the system of African customary law knew no
distinction between the executive, the judicial and the legislative arms of government. The judicial,
executive and law-making powers vested in kings and chiefs. The Court further stated that the notion
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separated was not only alien to the socialand political organization underlying African customary law
but also to the values underlying it. Therefore to impose on it the requirement ofindependence based
on the Western view would be at variance with the constitutional endeavour to retain African
customary law and not debase it, as well as the constitutional endeavour to retain traditional
authorities and not undermine them .15
It can be construed that the application of customary law is essentially a state function in the nature
ofadministrative or executive acts executed through the houses oftraditional leaders or through the
council of traditional leaders coming under constitutional scrutiny when a right of an individual is
violated or threatened with violation . 16 This implies the vertical application i.e. between the state and
subject of the state.
Although the Constitution enjoins the courts to apply customary law when that law is applicable,17
in applying the Bill ofRights to natural persons, interse, the courts are enjoined to apply the common
law in the absence of legislation - such application being in respect of giving effect to the right or
limiting the right." No reference is made to customary law except that when developing the
customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects ofthe Bill
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First but somewhat tenuously, it would matter not whether the omission is deliberate or not as there
is no substantial difference in the application of customary law and the common law as between
private persons. The application of either will be informed by the same values underlying the Bill of
Rights irrespective ofconsiderations ofcultural and legal pluralism. The result will be that principles
ofcustomary law will inevitably be integrated with those ofthe common law where they affect private
relationships.20
Second but perhaps more cogently, if considerations of cultural and legal pluralism are indeed
significant then the omission is deliberate and calculated. African customary law has been the subject
ofneglect during colonial and post-colonial times either for the reason that it was not understood or
that it did not comport with the values as conceived within the context ofEuropean jurisprudence or
both. But whatever was recognized was done so through the medium of the Black Administration
Act" for the purposes of political expediency and that which was considered offensive either by
reason of public policy or natural justice was expunged by the courts through the application of the
'repugnancy proviso' .22 The deleterious effect ofthis was that customary law was removed from its
social matrix and failed to be developed by the courts within the context ofan Africanjurisprudence.
But more importantly, the very nature and character of African customary law must be considered
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ofAfrican customary law is predicated on a communitarian ethic conceptualized within' [t]he context
of the family, clan, ethnic solidarity or the kinship network'P rather than on the human person as
individuals. 24 As such it primarily promotes and protects group interests, cultural and traditional rights
rather than individual human rights as is contemplated by the horizontal application of the Bill of
Rights between private persons. The result would be an internal conflict of laws" - group rights
versus individual rights both ofwhich the Constitution asserts and protects.
Given the fact that the courts lack an African jurisprudence,26 that African customary law is socialist
in nature and is best applied by traditional chiefs and headmen who have the competence" and within
whose jurisdiction it is primarily reposed supports the interpretation that it is not ofdirect horizontal
application but that the Constitution provides for the indirect incremental development of it. That
where the application ofa custom or customary law is violative ofa private law right, it would be the
ardent and urgent task of the legislature in the first instance to redress the wrong." It is suggested
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respect of the customary law is intended .29
5.3 African Customary Law in the Private Sphere
5.3.1 African Customary Law and Family Law
African customary law is essentially a social system of rules ensuring the perpetuation ofthe family
unit and clan within the kinship network and does not disregard the context of cultural and legal
pluralism. It is communitarian rather than individualistic." In this respect it is generally consonant
with the second generation rights i.e. the socio-economic rights relating to social security and
cultural, religious and linguistic freedoms." It also substantially accords with international human
rights norms relating to the recognition and protection of the family as the unit of society."
Although African customary law is generally compatible with the notion of human rights, there are
recognized areas that offend against fundamentally protected human rights. Nhlapo has identified a
'hit list' of certain practices in African customary law that would be violative of constitutionally
protected human rights. These practices stem from the African concept of the customary marriage
and have been identified as: polygyny, lobolo, the levirate, the sororate, child betrothal and mourning
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the nature and consequences of the African customary marriage as it at present exists in order to
appreciate the effects of any proposed legislation.
5.3.2. The Nature and Characteristics of African Customary Marriages
It is generally recognized that it is those fundamental characteristics of the African customary
marriage which limit the rights ofwomen that will come into conflict with the fundamental provisions
of the Bill ofRights - primarily the equality provisions relating to sex and gender discrimination."
2 5.3.1 Patriarchy
The African customary marriage was conceived within the context of an agrarian society whose
survival was determined by the size of the clan which in turn depended on the family unit. A
characteristic of the extended family unit unlike that of the nuclear family system of European
societies," is that the interests ofthe individual was subordinated in favour ofthe group in which the
interests ofmales predominate. Essential elements ofthe family unit were patriarchy, patrilineage and
primogeniture ofmales through males . The perpetuation of the clan within the kinship network was
secured through the practice of the sororate and the levirate where the former required a younger
sister to fulfil the need to procreate in the event ofthe death or barrenness ofher sister and the latter
which required a relative of a deceased husband to exploit the procreative capacities of the widow.
34
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5.3.2 .2 Polygamy, Polygyny and Polyandry
Compatible with the notion of the extended family system and the size of the clan within the kinship
network is the practice of polygyny and polyandry" thus making African customary marriages
polygamous in nature. Although not essentially discriminatory, the fact that polyandry is seldom ever
practised, polygyny is alive and thriving and would be regarded by ardent feminists whether African
or otherwise as blatantly discriminatory. Perhaps, the greatest disadvantage to the African female
spouse is that because of its polygamous nature which is deemed to be offensive to Christian values
of marriage and the family, the African customary marriage has failed to attain the status of a civil
marriage. However, it is generally acknowledged that African women do not regard the practice of
polygyny and the levirate as obnoxious."
5.3.2.3 Bridewealth
Another institution ofAfrican customary marriage that would in terms ofconstitutional norms offend
against feminists' rights is the payment of bridewealth commonly known as lobolo" which is a
contractual undertaking by a prospective husband or the head ofhis family to deliver property either
in cash or kind usually cattle, to the head of the prospective wife's family in consideration of a
customary marriage and which would provide security and maintenance for the bride and her children
whose custody rests with her upon her return in the event of the failure of the marriage through no
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that her person is equated to commercialized property,39 the practice of lobolo is entrenched as a
practice within African communities as it stillconstitutes a family's or clan's economic status as well
as social and cultural standing within the kinship."
5.3.2.4 Other Discriminatory Practices
African custom established on the patrilineal extended family system, does not recognize proprietary
rights ofwomen as all property acquired during the subsistence of a customary marriage accrued to
the male family head and upon his death would devolve in terms of African customary law of
succession on the eldest male descendant. However, the capacity ofBlack women" was improved
when Section 11A of the Black Administration Act conferred limited proprietary rights and
obligations on them in respect of the acquisition of leasehold, sectional title and ownership of
immovable property. This provision attempts to reduce the stifling effects ofcustomary marriages on
African women in respect of proprietary rights in that they can sue and be sued but neglects non-
proprietary rights .42
5.3.2.5 The Current Status of African Women in Customary Marriages





See June Sinc1air op cit n 5 at 565.
See CRM Dlamini op cit n 23 at 78-79 .
African and Black are used synonymously.
See Kim Robinson 'The Minority and Subordinate Status of African Women Under
Customary Law' (1995) SAJHR 457-476 at 462.
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of the Marriage Act of 196143, African women married according to custom remain shackled to the
marital power of their husbands . In civil marriages as recognized in terms of the Marriage Act,
married women now enjoy equality with their husbands irrespective of the marital regime by which
they may be bound. This is so because the marital power of their husbands has been removed by
statute thereby conferring upon them legal capacity as well as locus standi in judicio equivalent to
that of their spouse."
The position of African women in customary marriages remains invidious to the fundamental right
to equality and freedom from discrimination by reason of gender or sex." Perpetual tutelage under
the guardianship or marital power of the husband is sustained by statute. Section 11 (3)(b) of the
Black Administration Act46 expressly declares all Black women except those permanently residing
in KwaZulu-Natal to be minors under the guardianship of their husbands whereas those women
residing in KwaZulu-Natal though not considered minors are in terms of section 27(3) of both the
KwaZulu Act on the Code of Zulu Law47 and the Natal Code of Zulu Law48 to be subject to the







Act 25 of 1961.
See the relevant provisions of the Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1984 which applied
only to marriages celebrated after the commencement of the Act i.e. 1 November 1984,
and the General Law Fourth Amendment Act 132 of 1993 which abolished the marital
power of the husband in all marriages even those African civil marriages registered in
terms of the Marriage and Matrimonial Property Law Amendment Act 3 of 1988.
See also June Sinclair op cit note 5 541-542 together with relevant footnotes.
There appears not to be any distinc tion between sex and gender in the Constitution. See
AJ Kerr op cit n 4 fn 14 at 723.
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status of African women is more complex. Section 3 of the Transkei Marriage Act
49
equates the
status of customary marriages with those of civil marriages and recognizes the simultaneous
subsistence of these. This notwithstanding, section 37 provides that in both civil and customary
marriages the wife shall be under the guardianship ofthe husband and that in terms of section 39 his
marital power cannot be affected in any way.
All of these provisions in terms of the values underpinning the notion of human rights in the
Constitution are noxious to the emancipation ofAfrican women married by customary law. They are
not only violative of the right to equality and freedom from discrimination but also of other rights
such as the right to dignity, freedom and security ofthe person as well as the right to be free from all
forms of violence from either public or private sources, and the right to bodily and psychological
integrity. 50
5.3.2.6 The Current Status of African Customary Marriages
African customary marriages in terms of existing legislation do not enjoy equal status with those of
civil marriages registered under the Marriage Act except in the Transkei. Section 22 (1) ofthe Black
Administration Act 38 of 1927, however, allows a man and a woman between whom a customary
union subsists to contract a civil marriage provided that the man is not already a partner to a
subsisting customary union with another woman. In terms ofSection 22 (2) but subject to subsection
49
50
Act 21 of 1978.
See Kim Robinson op cit n 42 for an exhaustiveanalysisof the effectsof Section 11 (A)
of the BlackAdministration Act 38 of 1927and Section27 (3) of the KwaZuluAct on
the Codeof Zulu Law, Act 16 of 1985.
110
1, no person who is a partner in a customary union shall be competent to contract a civil marriage
during the subsistence of that union. 51 In other words, there cannot be a customary marriage and a
civilmarriage subsisting simultaneously. In effect the existence ofa customary union is an impediment
to a civil marriage except between the partners to an existing customary union.
Although customary unions could be registered'? and although they could be solemnized as a civil
marriage, if reference is had to the definition ofa customary union and marriage in terms ofthe Black
Administration Act, the position of a customary marriage is nebulous . In terms of the Act, a
'customary union' means the association ofa man and a woman in a conjugal relationship according
to Black law and custom, where neither the man nor the woman is a party to a subsisting marriage.
And a 'marriage' is described as a union of one man with one woman" in accordance with any law
for the time being in force in any Province governing marriages, but does not include any union
contracted under Black law or custom. 54
What then is urgently required to alleviate the inequalities relating to African women in customary
unions is legislation to recognize customary marriages in conformity with civil marriages so that
married women would enjoy equal status with their husbands while also appeasing the fundamental
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Two billswhich have been proposed to resolve the inequities resulting from customary marriages and
customary succession have been tabled before the National Assembly for debate and assent. These
are the Recognition of Customary Marriages Bill and the Amendment of Customary Law of
Succession Bill.ss
5.3.3.1 Recognition of Customary Marriages Bill
The principal object ofthis Bill is to recognize and give full legal status to marriages entered into in
accordance with indigenous law or traditional rites thereby improving the position of women and
children that will be consistent with the provisions of the Constitution. With reference to the
definitions in clause 1, 'customary law' means the customs and usages traditionally observed among
the indigenous African peoples ofSouth African and which form part ofthe culture ofthose peoples.
The Bill therefore does not relate to any other forms of customary marriages celebrated under any
other system of family law.
5.3.3.1.1 Recognition, Requirements and Registration of Customary Marriages.
The Bill recognizes both existing and future customary marriages whether monogamous or
polygamous save that those marriages yet to be celebrated will have to conform with certain
requirements of the Bill.s6 Primarily these are that the prospective spouses must be above 18 years
55
56
Bill No. B110-98 tabled on 25 August 1998 & Bill No. 109-98 tabled on 23 July 1998
and are being debated contemporaneously with the writing of this chapter.
Bill No. 110-98 clause 2.
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ofage and must have given their consent to such a marriage which must be celebrated in accordance
with customary law.57 Clause 4 provides for the formalities of registration of existing and future
customary marriages but failure to do so does not affect its validity nor does it attract a penalty. This
is salutary in the sense that to import a declaration of invalidity would perpetrate hardship on the
female spouse in communities that are largely rural and illiterate . But there are obvious disadvantages
in that proof of the marriage with consent as well as agreements relating to the patrimonial
consequences will be difficult to establish in the event ofa dispute. It is suggested that the traditional
authorities could do much in enforcing compliance by embarking on massive and effective education
programmes failing which iniquities would perpetuate.
5.3.3.1.2 Status of and Patrimonial Consequencesfor Spousesin Customary Marriages
Although the Bill proposes equal status in all respects for both spouses in a customary marriage,58
clause 7 proposes important consequences for existing and future customary marriages.
As far as existing marriages are concerned customary law determines the proprietary consequences
of the marriage which means that there is no improvement in the position of the female spouse and
her children. Any interference there could result in an odd dysfunction to any existing arrangements
and could result in family dislocation and social conflict. Nonetheless, the Bill allows a person who






i.e. the High Court" for an order to change the existing matrimonial property system and authorize
the parties to such a marriage or marriages to enter into a written contract in terms of which the
future matrimonial property system of their marriage or marriages would be regulated on the
conditions determined by the court." By the application ofthis mechanism many ofthe iniquities that
are attendant upon the patrimonial consequences governed by customary law could be avoided. It
may be added that the potential for breach of contract is enormous given the existing subordinate
position ofthe female spouse. Another point ofobservation is that where no contract is entered into
and where the proprietary consequences are determined by customary law, any conflict that may arise
in respect thereofwill have to be resolved by the courts in terms ofcustomary law save that in doing
so a court will have to be in formed by the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights - the
indirect application therefore.
Clause 7 (5) allows a spouse to an existing marriage to enter into a further marriage or marriages.
Such a spouse must make an application in a prescribed manner and the application must be brought
jointly with all interested parties so as to enable a court to grant an order that will allow for the
equitable distribution ofproperty. This provision perpetuates the practice ofcustomary marriages and
legitimizes the institutions of polygyny and the levirate as well as polyandry and the sororate.
As far as future customary marriages are concerned in which a spouse is not also a spouse to any




Ibid clause 7 (4).
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community ofproperty and ofprofit and loss unless such consequences are specifically excluded by
the spouses in an antenuptial contract which regulates the matrimonial system of their marriage."
Where the marriage is deemed to be in community of property, Chapter III and sections 18,19 and
20 of Chapter IV of the Matrimonial Property Act62 shall apply.
5.3.3.1.3 Changeof Marriage System and Divorce
While the Bill legitimizes existing customary marriages the patrimonial consequences of which are
to be governed by customary law, it also allows for partners to such an existing marriage to solemnize
their marriage in accordance with the Marriage Act, 25 of 1961 provided that they are not partners
to any other subsisting customary marriage. Once so registered the customary marriage is deemed
to be dissolved and the matrimonial property ofthe civil marriage is deemed to be governed by the
relevant provisions ofthe ofthe Matrimonial Property Act63 unless superceded by a notarially attested
contract. Once a civil marriage has been contracted all other marriages are prohibited during the
subsistence of the marriage .64
Another provision in the Bill that can be construed as attenuating any iniquities arising from existing





Ibid clause 7 (2).
Act 88 of 1984. Chapter III allows for equal and concurrent administration of the joint
estate and the relevant provisions of Chapter IV deal with several liability or
entitlement of the spouses in respect of non-patrimonial damages.
Act 88 of 1984, Chapter III and Sections 18,19 & 20 of Chapter IV.
See also n 58.
Gp cit n 55 Clause 10.
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on the ground of irretrievable breakdown." Where this happens then the relevant provisions of the
Divorce Act, 1979 (Act No. 70 of 1979) and the Mediation in Certain Divorce Matters Act, 1987
(Act 24 of 1987) come into play." The courts are empowered to make orders relating to custody or
guardianship of any minor child of the marriage as well as orders for the payment of maintenance
which would take into account any payment made in accordance with customary law.67
5.3.3.2 Amendment of Customary Law of Succession Bill
The existing customary law of succession which sustains the practice of primogeniture of males
through males and universal succession is offensive not only to gender equality but substantive
equality ofwomen and children irrespective ofgender. This practice is legislated in terms of section
23 of the Black Administration Act.68
The Amendment of Customary Law Succession Bi1169 proposes to extend the South African law of
testate and intestate succession to all persons so as to bring it into conformity with the Constitution.
Clause 2 (2) in particular makes the Intestate Succession Act applicable to the estate ofa person who
was a party to a valid customary marriage that subsisted at the time of that person's death . Clause







Ibid Clause 8 (l) & (2).
Ibid Clauses 8 (3) & (5) resp.





It is apparent from the texts ofboth Bills that the legislature is attempting to improve the position
ofwomen and children who suffer under the unequal discriminatory practices of customary law.
The Bill on the recognition of customary marriages undoubtedly lays the foundation for a uniform
code of marriage and provides a structure for the future recognition of marriages concluded under
any tradition, or a system of religious, personal or family law. " This is essential to avoid conflicting
judgments in the case ofthe recognition ofother forms ofcustomary marriages, particularly marriages
concluded under the system of Islamic law. The following cases illustrate this.
In Ryland v Edros" the court in determining the validity of a contractual agreement between the
spouses to a Muslim marriage, took the view that potentially but not actually polygamous unions
entered in under the tenets of the Muslim faith and Islamic law were not per se contrary to public
policy. Such public policy was to be informed by the principles of equality and tolerance ofdiversity
in a plural society and that it was inimical to all the values underlying the Interim Constitution (thus
also the Constitution) for one group to impose its sense ofvalues on another. In a show ofjudicial
activism and revisionism in applying and developing the common law, the Court effectively set aside
the judgment in Ismail v Ismail" where the Appellate Divisionofthe Supreme Court declared Islamic




See Section 15 (3) (a) (i) of the Constitution, Act 108 of 1996.
1997 (1) BCLR 77 (C) .
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However in Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accident Fund" the Court in applying and,
developing the common law, took a conservative and executive-minded approach in determining the
validity of Islamic marriages. Distinguishing itself from Ryland v Edros", the Court held that
developing the common law did not mean that a court could eliminate or alter the common law. This
was a function ofthe legislature" for to do so it would be arrogating to itselflegislative power which
it did not have." Accordingly, it held that it could not alter the established law by importing into it
a principle that a duty to support not founded in a lawful marriage is sufficient to ground the liability
which the plaintiff in casu sought to enforce against the defendant.
It is submitted, however, that the High Courts as well as the Constitutional Court have the inherent
power to develop the common law and to give effect to a right where the legislature does not do so
and could therefore eliminate or alter the common law if it is in the interest ofjustice. It is suggested
that that would be the case where women married in accordance with Islamic law would no longer
suffer the discrimination of a law that did not recognize the systems of marriages that are typical of
plural societies apart from considerations ofthe constitutional guarantees ofequality, freedom, dignity
and cultural diversity.
The Recognition of Customary Marriages Bill which proposes the repeal ofexisting legislation that
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for both feminist scholarship" and male chauvinism." It appeals to those 'academic devotees'" who
clamour for the preservation ofcustomary law seen in its true context and attempts not to throw out
the baby with the bath water but 'to salvage a ''usable residue" of Africanness which will enhance
rather than diminish the human rights ideal in family law., 80
The Bill bridges the gap between the 'old' and the 'new' . It not only gives expression to cultural
pluralism as envisaged in the Constitution" but also acknowledges the duality of legal systems and
legal pluralism which envisages the appearance and development of an African jurisprudence Afro-
centric in nature. And in striving to preserve African cultural traditions it attempts to reconcile these
values with those espoused by the Constitution. It comports with and is consonant with the theory
ofliberty? for it allows African spouses the freedom of choice between a customary marriage and a
civil one but not both - it does not interfere with the ordering of private lives. But above all, it







June Sinclair op cit n 5 and Kim Robinson op cit n 42.
CRM Dlamini op cit n 23.
It appears that a major criticism by the IFP is that the Bill 'westernizes' African
customary marriages. See the editorial comment 'Legal Tangles ' in the Daily News
Wednesday, November 4, 1998 at 8.
See the materials cited in this Chapter.
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CONCLUSIONS
The new text of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, unequivocally and
unambiguously asserts that a provision of the Bill of Rights binds a natural or juristic person. The
horizontal application of the bill is therefore entrenched in that violations of the rights ofvictims by
private actors in the private sphere henceforth comes under constitutional scrutiny. But the text does
not answer away all the apprehensions expressed by the majority in Du Plessis v De Klerk.
This study which analysizes the text with reference to those apprehensions produces certain
conclusions.
The horizontal application ofthe Bill ofRights envisages and augurs the innovation and development
ofa constitutional jurisprudence peculiar to the South African historical, social and political context.
This as a consequence can only be attributed to a judiciary inspired by a judicial activism committed
to judicial revisionism. The study reveals that such a consequence may also be attributed to the tact
that the constitutional jurisprudence oftoreign intemationallaw may not always be apposite such as
the .' state action ' doctrine of the United States ofAmerica. A constitutional jurisprudence premised
on constitutional supremacy that scrutinizes private action heralds the demise of the public/private
dichotomy predicated on parliamentary sovereignty and legalpositivism; ifnot its demise, then at least
its de-emphasis.
The application of the Bill of Rights in terms of the text of the Constitution does not allow for an
unqualified application in the private sphere since reference must be had to the nature ofthe right and
the duty imposed by the right. This task is reposed on the judiciary which will have to develop a
jurisprudence on a case by case basis. The 'egregious caricature' ofinterference in the private sphere
that was so vehemently portrayed in Du Plessis v De Klerk is exorcized if a doctrine of law
established on a theory of liberty is accepted and recognized. Such a theory confirms the existence
of spheres of private autonomy that is inviolate and beyond constitutional scrutiny. But the
sacrosanctity of such spheres ofprivate autonomy is not absolute. They indeed lose their innermost
120
cores of intimacy once the private action assumes a public character.
The study also reveals that areas of the law that were almost entirely neglected before the advent of
constitutionalism is now coming under the immediate scrutiny and attention of the legislature. The
proposed bills relating to the recognition of African customary marriages and the repeal ofthe laws
ofAfrican succession are attempts to constitutionalize these practices in accordance with the values
and norms enshrined in the Constitution and within the context of equality jurisprudence.
It reveals too that foundations are being laid for the development of a constitutional jurisprudence
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